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INTRODUCTION

Most jurisdictions within the United States currently utilize the post-mortem model of probate. Under this theory, an
individual of legal age and of sufficient mental health plans for
the distribution of his bounty at death, apportioning shares to
individuals or organizations that he feels are most deserving.
These generous intentions are then formalized by being
scribed into his last will and testament, which is stored in a
safe and often secret place. The will awaits the death of its
writer so that at the time of probate, it can be read once again
to proclaim donative intent and assure that the estate is distributed in accordance with the testator's desires. While this
theory of probate sounds quite proper, experience has revealed
that in many cases it serves only to destroy the very intentions
which it is designed to protect. Post-mortem probate provides
a feeding ground for spurious will contests which eat away the
corpus of an estate no longer protected by the evidentiary
power that lies buried with the testator.
An alternative to post-mortem probate is to validate the
testator's will during the testator's lifetime. This is known as
ante-mortem or living probate. Although some believe antemortem probate is a controversial solution to the difficulties
encountered with post-mortem probate, ante-mortem probate
has roots reaching as far back as the biblical era. In addition,
it was first implemented in the United States, albeit unsuccessfully, in the late nineteenth century. This article will discuss
the problems with post-morter probate and will demonstrate
that conventional techniques fail to adequately resolve these
difficulties. The evolution of ante-mortem probate which lead
to the three modern models of ante-mortem probate will be
described. Attention will then turn to the three states which
have ante-mortem statutes and the unsuccessful effort of the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws to approve a uniform act. Finally, the authors will urge
that ante-mortem probate be given serious consideration because it has significant benefits while its potential problems
can be surmounted or counterbalanced.
From the outset, readers should be aware that the purpose of this article is neither to suggest that the post-mortem
model of probate be abolished nor that ante-mortem probate
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is a panacea. Rather, it is to demonstrate that ante-mortem
probate is a viable technique which could serve to reduce the
problematic side of the current post-mortem system and provide a wide range of benefits to a significant segment of the
public.
II. INADEQUACY OF POST-MORTEM PROBATE
A.

Difficulties with Post-Mortem Probate

There are three basic areas which demonstrate the flaws
in any post-mortem probate system: the encouragement of
spurious will contests, the frustration of the testator's intent,
and the creation of significant evidentiary problems.
Although these areas are discussed separately, they cannot be
truly compartmentalized. In addition, other difficulties are
subsumed in these three categories, such as the tremendous
wasting of court time and estate resources which occurs whenever probate matters are disputed on artificial grounds.
1. Encouraging Spurious Will Contests
[T]he post mortem squabblings and contests on mental condition... have made a will the least secure of all human
dealings, and made it doubtful whether in some regions insanity is not accepted as the normal condition of testators.,
One of the major purposes of a post-mortem will contest
is to ensure that deserving heirs do not lose their portion of a
decedent's estate as a result of fraud, improper influence, or
insufficient capacity which may have affected the decedent at
the time he executed his will.2 Synthesized by the greedy plots
of disgruntled devisees and disinherited heirs, however, the
will contest has taken on several new dimensions. These include attempts to prove lack of mental capacity, fraud, or improper influence where none existed for the sole purpose of
1. Lloyd v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 56 Mich. 236, 242, 23 N.W. 28, 30 (1885).
2. Wilson v. Kemp, 7 Ark. App. 44, 51, 644 S.W.2d 306, 310 (1982) (the probate
court has duty to preserve interest of those who are or who may become beneficiaries of
decedent's estate); Will of Wharton, 114 Misc. 2d 1017, -, 453 N.Y.S.2d 308, 311

(1982) (the purpose of probate is to distribute assets according to testator's intentions
only if testator is free from restraint, has testamentary capacity, and is otherwise competent). Cf Palazzi v. Estate of Gardner, 32 Ohio St. 3d 169, -, 512 N.E.2d 971, 974
(1987) (the ability to contest will constitutes constitutionally protected interest).
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taking a greater share of the bounty. These apocryphal challenges to the integrity of the testator place tremendous financial strain on the corpus of the estate and, to prevent total
depletion, are often settled out of court. Because of the extratribunal nature of these settlements, their consuming effect is
seldom recorded, making the extent of their thievery difficult
to determine; however, everyday knowledge and experience
suggests that this practice is widespread. 3
Under the majority of post-mortem procedures, the
plaintiff, after losing a spurious will contest, is not required to
reimburse the decedent's estate for attorney's fees and court
costs expended while defending the unjustified claim.' This
practice encourages a potential heir to attempt to "strike it
rich" because even if the attack is unsuccessful, the penalty
suffered will be little more than disappointment. 5
While monetary gain is generally the motivating factor
behind spurious will contests, another common factor, even
more morally abhorrent, is the desire of a disinherited relative
to embarrass and tarnish the actions of the testator and his
family with the proverbial skeletons which are pulled from the
family closet during capacity litigation.6 The adoption of
some type of ante-mortem probate could work in conjunction
with current post-mortem procedures to effectively carry out
3. See, e.g., Letter to the Missouri Bar Association (June 29, 1933), reprinted in 4
Mo. B.J. 110 (1933); N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 1931, at 54, col. 4; N.Y. Times, June 30,
1933, at 19, col. 6.
4. See, e.g., Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4 n.4 (1973); Succession of Montegut, 508
So. 2d 892, 896 (La. App. 1987) (no valid claim for damages for frivolous challenge
unless filed solely for delay or without sincere belief of meritorious challenge); In re
Estate of Nelson, 281 N.W.2d 245, 250 (N.D. 1979) (costs and attorneys fee's recoverable from will contestants where challenge was made without reasonable cause, not in
good faith and found to be untrue); see also In re Estate of Kern, 239 Kan. 8, 716 P.2d
528, 538 (1986) (beneficiaries not entitled to recover attorney's fees where contest is not
frivolous). Cf N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT LAW § 2302(3)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1989)
(an unsuccessful claimant may be required to pay costs); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-4-101
(1984) (contestant is required to post bond to secure payment of costs if unsuccessful);
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 879.33 (West Supp. 1988) (losing party may be required to pay
costs).

5. See Comment, The Ante Mortem Alternative to Probate Legislation in Ohio, 9
U.L. REV. 717, 719 (1980) (a will challenger possesses evidentiary advantages
because the burden of proving a will's validity lies in its proponent).
6. Id. at 719 n.19 (an argument could be made that such motivation is void as
against public policy).
CAP.
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the intent of the decedent, while protecting against overcrowding the courts with unfounded litigation.
2.

Frustrating the Testator's Intent
The primary function of testamentary law is to maintain
efficient procedures for the transfer of the testator's property
at the time of his death in accordance with his intentions.7 A
will is designed to disrupt the usual flow of property established by law from the testator to his next of kin.8 Because a
will often transfers property to a specific person, it may be
considered a type of conveyance allowing the decedent to enjoy final control of the disposition of his estate.9 The ability to
convey one's property is a right which every property owner
normally enjoys during his life and, by use of a will, expects to
have upon his death. Therefore, a person anticipates having
sole control-both before and after death-over the disposition of his property.'" Few would argue with the premise that
any legal technique that tends to thwart this basic right of
ownership is in some way defective.
Post-mortem probate allows a will to be invalidated by
reason of a pure technical error such as defective signatures or
attestation." Probate is necessary to test a will's validity and
to prove its authenticity.' 2 However, testing the validity of
the instrument after the testator's death is the most illogical
and impractical time for such scrutiny because even the simplest of errors have the unavoidable effect of destroying the
3
validity of a will and upsetting the testator's intentions.1
7.

See Cavers, Ante Mortem Probate: An Essay In Preventive Law, 1 U. CHI. L.

REV. 440, 440 (1934).

8. See Redfeam, Ante-Mortem Probate, 38 CoM. L.J. 571, 571 (1933) (property
transferred by will is analogous to conveyance but the instrument must first be proved
to be valid before the transfer is effective).
9. Id.
10. See Banks v. Goodfellow, 5 Q.B. 549, 564 (1870) ("power of disposing of property in anticipation of death has ever [sic] been regarded as one of the most valuable of
the rights incidental to property"); Cavers, supra note 7, at 445 (essence of will continues power of conveyance).
11. See Redfearn, supra note 8, at 572 (the most common causes for will contests
are attestation errors, forgery, undue influence, lack of testamentary capacity, and existence or conduct of potential heir). See infra note 13.
12. Id. at 571.
13. Id.; see also Orrell v. Cochran, 695 S.W.2d 552, 552 (Tex. 1985) (the signature
of a testator on self-proving affidavit rather than on the will invalidated the will); Boren
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No matter how sane, competent, and lucid a testator may
be or how strong his desire that his estate be administered by
trusted persons, our current system of post-mortem probate
cannot guarantee a testator that his intentions and instructions will be carried out in spite of all the expense and caution
exerted.' 4 The post-mortem probate system does not offer a
true and effective method to probate a will nor does it test the
validity of the intentions expressed within it because the best
evidence, the testimony of the testator, is unavailable.15 Postmortem probate creates a situation in which excluded heirs
are invited to challenge the will and use the testator's expressed intentions to destroy the instrument, question the
giver's sanity, and line their own pockets with property that
was never intended to be theirs.' 6 Post-mortem probate law is
encumbered with antiquated presumptions, procedures, and
traditions, which by resisting statutory alteration, are sure to
frustrate testamentary intent and reveal with shining clarity
the need for an alternative.' 7
Under the post-mortem system, judges and jurors often
evaluate the testator's scheme by their own standards of what
a fair and normal distribution should be. 18 This procedure has
v. Boren, 402 S.W.2d 728, 729-30 (Tex. 1966) (signatures of witnesses on self-proving
affidavit rather than on will invalidated will). But cf Langbein, SubstantialCompliance
With the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 489, 489 (1975) ("insistent formalism of the law
of wills is mistaken and needless").
14. See Redfearn, supra note 8, at 571 (voidness of will due to simple mistake is an
unreasonable solution); Comment, supra note 5, at 717-18 (testator's fear that testamentary disposition of property will not be by his expressed intent calls into question the
ability of probate law to fulfill its purpose and function).
15. See Redfearn, supra note 8, at 571.
16. See Fink, Ante-Mortem Probate Revisited. Can An Idea Have a Life After
Death?, 37 OHIO ST. L.J. 264, 265-66 n.1 (1976) (provides examples of will contests
brought by unscrupulous heirs).
17. See Langbein, supra note 13, at 489 (any formal defect found in a will causes it
to fail despite voluminous evidence that defect was inconsequential); Comment, Contemporary Ante-Mortem Statutory Formulations.: Observations and Alternatives, 32
CASE W. RES. 823, 825 (1982) (ante-mortem probate provides solutions to post-mortem
quandaries such as testator's intent and capacity as well as attorney malpractice).
18. See Fellows, The Case Against Living Probate, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1066, 1070
(1980); North Carolina Nat'l Bank v. Goode, 298 N.C. 485, -, 259 S.E.2d 288, 292
(1979) (the court presumed distributive scheme which lessened federal taxes); In re Estate of Khadad, 135 Misc. 2d 67, -, 514 N.Y.S.2d 625, 627-28 (1987) (the court construed will as benefitting surviving spouse by allowing maximum marital deduction).
But see Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Schwartz, 120 Ill.
App. 3d 324, -, 458 N.E.2d
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the effect of subjecting testamentary transfers to meticulous
examination when the same transaction, if done inter vivos,
would hardly have been questioned. 1 9 The paradox existing
between inter vivos and testamentary transfers strongly suggests that post-mortem probate fails to protect not only the
testator's intent, but also the basic rights and principles associated with the ownership of property.2" This paradox between
inter vivos and testamentary transfers can be easily illustrated
with stories in which wealthy testators intend that their
bounty be devised to deserving charitable organizations only
to become the subject of ridicule and accusation at the hands
of their heirs and devisees. 2'
Under the ante-mortem alternative the deceased testator
could receive the same level of respect given him while alive.
Furthermore, the testator could ensure that the intent expressed in his will would be as secure as that of any competent
person recorded in an error-free medium.
3.

Creating Significant Evidentiary Problems

One of the recurring problems with post-mortem probate
is that the trier of fact must determine the condition of the
testator's mind and the validity of the will by making inferences from evidence of past conduct and circumstances surrounding the testator. The evidentiary problems are both
complex and numerous because the testator is dead and cannot testify as to his true intent. Only indirect evidence is
available to test his capacity which, whether he was a mad151, 154 (1983) (a court may not alter scheme of distribution even if it is illogical or
peculiar where it is not contrary to clear intent of testator).
19. Comment, supra note 5, at 718 (failure of testamentary law to fulfill testators'
desires causes testators to deplete their estates).
20. See Taft, Comments on Will Contests in New York, 30 YALE L.J. 593, 606
(1921) (wills are scrutinized even though the person's capacity to make deed or contract
would not be questioned if he or she were alive thus interfering with owner's right to
transfer property to desired person).
21. See Fink, supra note 16, at 265-66 n.1 (provides examples of will contests by
desperate heirs); see also Baliles v. Miller, 231 Va. 48, -, 340 S.E.2d 805, 810 (1986)
(heirs argue against applying cy pres doctrine or implied trust to vague charitable bequest); In re Will of McCarthy, 49 A.D.2d 204, -, 374 N.Y.S.2d 203, 208-09 (1975)
(the court prevented lapse of gift to convent no longer in existence); Succession of Sturgis, 516 So. 2d 1293, 1298 (La. App. 1987) (questionable claim of perpetual drunkenness of testator as challenge to will containing charitable bequest).
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man or simply eccentric with his property, tends to be a matter of mere speculation. In addition, the quality of any
evidence, particularly recollection, deteriorates with time.22
These evidentiary problems encourage and provide an
advantage to spurious will contests. For example, in Hickman
v. Hickman,23 a Texas court stated that a will which failed to
provide for the testator's wife and child supported the jury
finding of insufficient mental capacity despite numerous witnesses' testimony that the testator was of sound mind at the
time the will was executed.24
Some attention must be given to the evidentiary advantages that the contestants to a post-mortem procedure enjoy
which encourage spurious challenges to a will's validity.25
Any litigation is a financial burden on the estate and on the
rightful beneficiaries, particularly if the estate pays the cost of
litigation for unsuccessful challenges.2 6 This financial burden
has a tendency to force settlements of unfounded challenges.27
Furthermore, the burden is on the proponent of the will to
prove capacity.28 However, the star witness, the testator, is
22. See McCrystal & Maschari, Will Electronic Technology Take the Witness
Stand?, 11 U. TOL. L. REV. 239, 249-52 (1980) (potential inaccuracies of human memory create inconsistencies, bias, prejudice, and inaccuracy which slow the administration of justice).
23. 244 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
24. Id. at 683-84.
25. See Comment, supra note 5, at 718-19 (post-mortem probate poses evidentiary
problems of placing the testator's testimony beyond the court's reach and deterioration
of witnesses' recollection of events surrounding execution of will).
26. See Cahn, Undue Influence and Captation-A Comparative Study, 8 TUL. L.
REV. 507, 517 (1934) (fees and expenses of contested probate proceedings are tacked to
testator's estate while rarely imposed on unsuccessful contestants); Comment, supra
note 5, at 719 (despite spurious nature of contestant's claim to will's validity, monetary
burden of litigation traditionally falls upon estate leaving the unsuccessful challenger
only disappointed).
27. See Cavers, supra note 7, at 443 n.10 (although elderly New York recluse left
no relatives, 2,360 people attempted to establish themselves as heirs with some individuals related in the fifth degree settling for $2,000,000 not to contest will).
28. See, e.g., Cushman v. Nichols, 20 Mass. App. 980, -, 482 N.E.2d 862, 864
(1985) (the proponent has ultimate burden of proving testamentary capacity); Estate of
Jenks, 291 Minn. 138, -, 189 N.W.2d 695, 698 (1971) (the burden of proving mental
capacity rests with proponent of will); Estate of Kumstar, 66 N.Y.2d 691, -, 496
N.Y.S. 414, -, 487 N.E.2d 271, 272 (1985) (the proponent of will has burden of proving testamentary capacity); Croucher v. Croucher, 660 S.W.2d 55, 57 (Tex. 1983) (the
burden of proving capacity is on proponent). But see, e.g., Sessions v. Handley, 470 So.
2d 1164, 1167 (Ala. 1985) (the contestant has burden of proving lack of testamentary
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unable to present his proof personally.29 Similarly, because of
the length of time that normally elapses between the execution
of a will and its subsequent challenge, witnesses necessary to
prove the testator's capacity may no longer be available.3 °
The ante-mortem probate alternative would significantly reduce the evidentiary problems found in post-mortem systems.
A living probate system allows a court to evaluate testamentary capacity while the testator is still alive to present his
evidence. 3' An ante-mortem approach would prevent the
court and jury from being swayed by their own perceptions of
the inequitable treatment of the disinherited kin. 32 Other advantages which stem from using ante-mortem techniques include: 1) evidence could be presented in a non-adversarial
context under some models;33 2) the testator would be available to the court to eliminate ambiguous silence; 3) the circumstances of disinheritance could be explored beyond the
realm of mere conjecture; 34 and 4) the heirs apparent must
choose to contest the will earlier than is in their interest to do,
capacity based on presumption of capacity to make a will); Succession of Lyons, 452 So.
2d 1161, 1164 (La. 1984) (the burden of proving lack of capacity is on party so alleging);
Estate of Kesler, 702 P.2d 86, 88 (Utah 1985) (contestant has burden of proving testamentary incapacity).
29. See Comment, supra note 5, at 717-19 (post-mortem probate poses problems of
its inability to guarantee testator's desires, deteriorating evidence, and spurious challenges, all of which could be remedied by allowing testator to testify in ante-mortem
proceeding).
30. Id. at 718-19.
31. Id.
32. See Redfearn, supra note 8, at 572 (disinherited heirs would be cautious to
challenge testator's devise if they knew testator would rebut their challenge face-toface); see also Armstrong v. Butler, 262 Ark. 31, 41, 553 S.W.2d 453, 458 (1977) (presumption against disinheriting lineal descendants); Trust Co. Bank v. First Nat'l Bank,
246 Ga. 222, -, 271 S.E.2d 141, 143 (1980) (where unclear, presumption,that testator
intended to pass property within bloodline); Estate of McAfee, 463 Pa. 250, -, 344
A.2d 817, 819 (1975) (will interpreted to conform most nearly with intestate laws where
ambiguity exists); Porter v. Porter, 286 N.W.2d 649, 655-56 (Iowa 1979) (will construed
in favor of following laws of descent and distribution unless clear indication of
disinheritance).
33. See Redfearn, supra note 8, at 572 (the purpose of ante-mortem probate is to
establish will's validity during testator's lifetime rendering negatory challenges to will's
validity which are meant to disavow and destroy testator's intent).
34. See Langbein, Living Probate: The ConservatorshipModel, 77 MICH. L. REV.
63, 67-68 (1978) (testator would be expressly cautioned about seriousness and irregularity of projected disinheritance and asked to explain his reasons at or before the execution ceremony to preserve superior evidence of capacity).
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so, thus, alleviating any speculation as to their designs. In
sum, ante-mortem probate offers evidentiary advantages unequalled by its post-mortem counterpart.
B. Failure of Conventional Techniques to Adequately
Resolve Post-Mortem Difficulties
There are four conventional techniques which have attempted to resolve the problems with post-mortem probate:
non-probate transfers, self-proved wills, in terrorem clauses,
and videotaped will execution ceremonies. However, none of
these techniques are a substitute for ante-mortem probate.
1.

Non-Probate Transfers

Many testators frightened by the prospect of leaving their
families and estates subject to the roulette wheel of postmortem probate use other means to divest their fortunes in
order to avoid probate altogether. At least one commentator
has recommended that such techniques should be chosen over
the use of ante-mortem solutions. 3" However, these techniques offer only slightly more security than the probate they
claim to avoid. There are three commonly used methods of
non-probate transfers: revocable inter vivos trusts, joint ownership with survivorship rights, and outright gifts. 36 When

non-probate transfers are used, the common factor creating
instability is that people are motivated by fears that testamentary instructions will not be carried out. The' result is that the
post-mortem probate 'system is compromised.
Revocable Inter Vivos Trusts
Revocable inter vivos trusts have become a popular way
of avoiding probate.37 When a trust of this type is used, the
a.

35. Fellows, supra note 18, at 1067.
36. These three methods, of course, do not provide an exclusive list of the options
available.
37. See Sullivan v. Burkin, 390 Mass. 864, -, 460 N.E.2d 572, 575 (1984) (revocable trust is not invalid as testamentary disposition); Westerfeld v. Huckaby, 474 S.W.2d
189, 193 (Tex. 1971) (trust is not invalid because its purpose is to avoid probate); Davis
v. KB & T Co., 309 S.E.2d 45, 49 (W. Va. 1983) (ability to revoke trust does not render
trust testamentary); see also Lundergan, Elderly Clients Require Special Lifetime Planning, TR. & EST., Feb. 1986, at 33-34 (self-declared trust is popular as probate avoidance device).
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settlor transfers property into the corpus of a trust and names
those persons as beneficiaries who would have received property under his will.3" When the settlor dies, the power to revoke the trust is extinguished.39 The trust continues to
operate in favor of the beneficiaries without the intervention of
probate.4' Although this technique is effective, there are both
positive and negative attributes which should be weighed in
considering it as an alternative to either post-mortem or antemortem probate. First, the trust offers protection by placing
property within the bounds of equity law where there is less
chance of a sympathetic jury upsetting the settlor's intentions.41 Second, the establishment of a trust reflects greater
deliberations on behalf of the would-be testator as to how he
wishes his property distributed. 42 Third, a trust generally provides intermediaries, such as a bank or trust officer, that can
be used to show the settlor's capacity by their reliance on his
demands.43
Revocable trusts have a dark side as well. Depending on
how they are worded, these trusts can be construed as valid
inter vivos conveyances," which may prompt judicial inquir38. The problem of perpetuities usually will not occur. For an excellent composition regarding this issue see T. BERGIN & P. HASKELL, PREFACE TO ESTATES IN LAND
AND FUTURE INTERESTS 208 (1984).
39. See Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Allen, 575 S.W.2d 654, 658 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978)
(a revocable trust becomes irrevocable on trustor's death). But see Euart v. Yoakley,
456 So. 2d 1327, 1329 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (an inter vivos trust may be revoked by
written will); Cisneros v. San Miguel, 640 S.W.2d 327, 330 (Tex. App. 1982) (a trust
conveys defeasible interest to beneficiary which can be defeated by revocation of trust,
disposition of trust res by will or nonexistence of res at death).
40. See Roberts v. Roberts, 286 F.2d 647, 652 (9th Cir. 1961) (property held under
valid inter vivos revocable trust became absolute property of beneficiary on death of
settlor); Favata v. Favata, 74 Ill. App. 3d 979, 982, 394 N.E.2d 443, 446 (1979) (interest
passes on creation of trust to beneficiary, not at death of settlor); In re Walz, 423
N.E.2d 729, 733 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (the transfer of property through inter vivos trust
vests interest at time of creation of trust thereby avoiding effect of probate); Citizens
Nat'l Bank v. Allen, 575 S.W.2d 654, 658 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (a beneficiary may
enforce a revocable inter vivos trust on death of settlor).
41. See Langbein, supra note 34, at 67 ("[t]rusts belong to the jury-free realm of
equity law").
42. See id. (an active settlor who conveys property to a corpus and who receives
income from a trust shows intentional conduct as compared to testator who merely
signs will).
43. Id.
44. Being outside the Wills Act, judges are faced with the task of defining the
intentions of the testator.
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ies to determine, nunc pro tunc, the legal intentions of the settlor. 45 Heirs may also challenge the validity of a revocable

trust by raising arguments similar to those employed in a will
contest, such as claims that fraud or undue influence was exerted on the settlor or that the settlor lacked capacity: 46
Therefore, although a revocable trust might decrease family
conflicts and provide greater control by the settlor over his
property, it still may not be the most appealing solution.
b. Joint Ownership with Survivorship Rights
Another common probate avoidance technique is joint
ownership of property with rights of survivorship.47 This estate planning tool, commonly used between spouses, permits
the property subject to the survivorship agreement to pass immediately to the surviving joint owner without the interference of a probate court.48 In many situations, this device will
effectuate the intent of the parties. However, it is not accurate
45. See Payne v. River Forest State Bank & Trust Co., 81 Ill. App. 3d 428, -, 401
N.E.2d 1229, 1233 (1980) (the retention of a life estate is relevant on the issue of
whether present donative intent exists); Cruse v. Leary, 727 S.W.2d 408, 410 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1987) (trust not deemed testamentary even though benefits are not distributed
until death of settlor).
46. See Dopp v. Sugarloaf Mining Co., 288 Ark. 18, 18, 702 S.W.2d 393, 393
(1986) (trust overturned based on fraud or forgery); Olson v. Harshman, 233 Kan.
1055, -, 668 P.2d 147, 149 (1983) (daughter sued to set aside trusts that were executed
by her parents on the grounds of undue influence by a brother); Coleman v. First Nat'l
Bank, 81 Nev. 51, -, 506 P.2d 86, 87 (1973) (daughter challenged trust on the basis of
incompetency at the time of execution); see also Nickerson v. Fiduciary Trust Co., 6
Mass. App. Ct. 317, -, 375 N.E.2d 357, 358 (1978) (settlor sues to reform or invalidate
trust on grounds of undue influence); Brinker v. Wobaco Trust Ltd., 610 S.W.2d 160,
163 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980) (equity allows reformation of trust where, by mistake, it fails
to express the true intent of settlor); see generally Fellows, supra note 18, at 1094.
47. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 658.56 (West 1984) (deposits and accounts in two
or more names); N.Y. BANKING L. § 675 (McKinney 1971 & Supp. 1989) (joint deposits and shares; ownership and payment); OHiO REV. CODE ANN. § 1107.08 (Baldwin
1988) (deposits in name of two or more persons payable on death); TEX. PROB. CODE
ANN. § 439(a) (Vernon Supp. 1990) (right of survivorship in bank accounts).
48. See Chopin v. Interfirst Bank Dallas N.A., 694 S.W.2d 79, 83-84 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1985) (nontestamentary transfers are governed by probate code for sums remaining on deposit at death of co-depositor); Sheffield v. Dozier, 643 S.W.2d 197, 198 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1982) (sums in joint account with right of survivorship are owned by survivor
and do not pass to estate); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 451 (Vernon Supp. 1990) (At any
time, spouses may agree that all or part of their community property, then existing or to
be acquired, becomes the property of the surviving spouse on the death of the other
spouse).
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to say that joint ownership with survivorship rights is an effective option to ante-mortem probate.
With joint ownership, each owner has the ability to control his or her proportionate share of the asset.49 Many individuals prefer to retain total control of the property until
death and are unwilling to divest themselves of those rights
prematurely.5 0 Even if the original owner agreed to relinquish
his or her rights, the entire transaction, including both its gift
and survivorship aspects, could be questioned by dissatisfied
heirs or will beneficiaries on various grounds such as lack of
capacity and undue influence.5"

c. Outright Gifts
The simplest and most pedestrian non-probate transfer is
the outright gift.5 2 Although gifts are effective in avoiding
49. See Gillota v. Gillota, 4 Ohio St. 3d 222, -, 448 N.E.2d 802, 804 (1983) (a
joint account with right of survivorship belongs to all parties during their lifetimes in
proportion to net contributions on deposit unless clear and convincing evidence exists of
a different intent); In re Estate of Thompson, 66 Ohio St. 2d 433, -, 423 N.E.2d 90, 94
(1981) (a joint account belongs to each depositor for so much as contributed during
their lifetimes unless clear and convincing evidence exists of a different intent); Isbell v.
Williams, 705 S.W.2d 252, 254 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (probate code established a rebuttable presumption of ownership in favor of depositor during,his lifetime unless contrary
intent is sfiown);, see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 658.55 (West 1984) (bank deposits made
in the names of two or more persons are payable to either during their lifetimes); N.Y.
BANKING L. § 675 (McKinney 1971 & Supp. 1989) (all deposits in any form in a joint
account are the property of all depositors as joint tenants and are payable to either or
both during their lifetimes); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 438 (Vernon 1980) (a joint account belongs to parties according to the net contributions of .each during their
lifetimes).
50. See M. RHEIN STEIN & M. GLENDON, THE LAW OF DECEDENTS' ESTATES
612 (1971) (discussing the reluctance of many people. to divest themselves of property
prior to death).
51. See, e.g., Briscoe v. Florida Nat'l Bank, 394 So. 2d 492, 493 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1981) (evidence of a confidential relationship between defendant and a 98 year old
decedent accompanied by defendant's procurement of a joint account created prima
facia case of undue influence); In re Estate of Webb, 18 Ohio App. 2d 287, -, 249
N.E.2d 83, 93 (1969) (when creator of a joint account becomes incompetent, the coowner no longer has authority to withdraw funds during his lifetime prior to creator's
death over his rightful share); In re Estate of Moore, 26 Ohio Op. 37, -, 188 N.E.2d
221, 224 (1962) (an 'incompetent depositor could not "riake a valid contract in a joint
tenancy account with a right of survivorship; thus, monies did not pass to survivor on
his death).
52. See Cogdill v. First Nat'l Bank, 193 S.W.2d 701, 702 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946)
(inter vivos gifts require delivery of subject matter by the donor to the donee and intent
by the donor to vest 'in the donee unconditional and immediate ownership of property
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probate, they are a poor substitute for ante-mortem probate.
While outright gifts are irrevocable,53 wills which have been
admitted to ante-mortem probate remain ambulatory.14 Only
individuals who are extremely wealthy or who are primarily
concerned with decreasing the size of their estate for tax reduction purposes are willing to divest themselves of their ownership rights in significant amounts of property prior to death;
people dislike placing themselves at the charity or mercy of
others. 5 As with the other two commonly used probate
avoidance techniques, outright gifts may also be contested on
various' grounds such as lack of capacity and undue
influence.5 6
2.

Self-Proved Wills

Pursuant to the Uniform Probate Code,57 as well as the
probate statutes of many states,5" a person may create a selfproved will by executing a separate instrument, usually an affidavit, along with the will. The accompanying instrument,
which is signed by the testator as well as the requisite number
of witnesses, is then notarized. 9 Although the self-proved
delivered); CAL. CIv. CODE § 1146-1148 (Deering 1988) (a gift is a voluntary, irrevocable transfer of personal property without consideration which requires actual or constructive delivery to donee).
53. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 1148 (Deering '1988) (any gift other than that
made in contemplation of death cannot be revoked by giver); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1339.33 (Baldwin 1988) (a gift or transfer made pursuant to certain statutory conditions is irrevocable).
54. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-40-203 (1987) ("validated wills may be modified or
superseded"); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-08.1-03 (Supp. 1989) (will is binding but may
be altered in a subsequent ante-mortem proceeding); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2107.084(D) (Anderson Supp. 1988) (modification and revocation permitted).
55. See M. RHEINSTEIN & M. GLENDON, supra note 50, at 612 ("it is not to many
people's taste to divest themselves ... of all property during their lifetimes and thus to
throw themselves upon other people's trust or charity").
56. See, e.g., Estate of Truckenmiller, 97 Cal. App. 3d 326, 334, 158 Cal. Rptr.
699, 704 (1979) (a gift may be set aside on the basis of undue influence by some act or
conduct of donee but not on belief of donor alone); Randolph v. Randolph, 28 Misc. 2d
66, -, 212 N.Y.S.2d 468, 471 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1961) (a gift induced by fraud may be
rescinded); Pace v. McEwen, 574 S.W.2d 792, 794 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (an aged and
frail donor who acted without independent advise ahd who gave fiduciary stock leaving
him in impoverished condition-was sufficient to suggest no intent to make gift).
57. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-504 (1982).
58. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 43-8-132 (Supp. 1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 474.337
(Vernon 1989); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 59 (Vernon 1980).
59. See supra notes 11-13.
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will provides a presumption that the mechanical elements of
the will have been satisfied, a contestant to the will may still
prove fraud, forgery, and undue influence. 6° While self-proving wills dispense with the need for witnesses at informal probate hearings, the affidavit only bolsters the will's validity
establishing a prima facia case of proper execution. It does
not, however, make a conclusive determination that a will is
valid and binding as does ante-mortem probate. Hence, it
cannot be a substitute for ante-mortem probate.6t
3.

In Terrorem Clauses

The use of in terrorem clauses is another method of discouraging will contests in post-mortem proceedings.62 This
type of clause reduces the potential contestant's financial incentive to challenge the will by giving him a sizeable bequest
provided he does not contest the will. Although typically this
bequest is substantially less than his intestate share, it is considerably more than what the contestant would receive if the
challenge fails.63 Many jurisdictions will only enforce these
forms of "primitive coercion ' 64 under certain circumstances.65
60. See UNIF.PROB. CODE § -3-406comment (1982) (self-proved will does not preclude proof of undue influence, revocation, lack of capacity, or testator's lack of knowledge of the natural objects of his bounty); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 59 (Vernon 1980)
("a self-proved, will may be contested ... in exactly the same fashion as a will not selfproved").
.61. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 17, at 842-50 (ante-mortem proceedings best
protect a testator's intent despite advocation of alternatives such as videotaped wills,
self-proved wills, and in terrorem clauses); Langbein, supra note 34, at 70 (conclusive
presumption afforded to self-proved wills expressly reserves a contestant's right to prove
fraud or forgery).
62. Comment, supra note 17, at 845-46, 851.
63. See id. at 842-45, 851 (clause typically gives token amount to potential will
contestants with condition precedent that there is no contest); see also Jack, No-Contest
or In Terrorem Clauses in Wills-Construction and Enforcement, 19 Sw.L.J. 722, 723
(1965) (no contest clause generally held valid and not against public policy).
64. Leavitt, Scope and Effectiveness of No-Contest Clauses in Last Wills and Testaments, 15 HASTINGs L.J. 45, 45 (1963).
65. see Broach v. Hester, 217 Ga. 59, -, 121 S.E.2d 111, 113 (1961) (in terrorem
clause enforceable only where a testator specifies "gift-over"); Estate of Westfahl, 674
P.2d 21, 23 (Okla. 1983) (clause is enforceable unless it is violation of public policy or
law); Veltmann v. Damon, 696 S.W.2d 241, 246 (Tex. App. 1985) (in terrorem clause
should be effective where the purpose of the contest is to thwart testator's intentions),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 701 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. 1985). But see
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.517 (West 1976) (penalty for cost unenforceable). See generally
Jack, supra note 63, at 726.
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For example, a forfeiture may not occur if the contest is instituted in good faith and with reasonable cause.66 However,
this conditional use opens the clause to attack by courts with
'67
liberal views as to what constitutes a "good faith contest.
The technical validity of a will is not established by in terrorem clauses. In fact, their use in a will may produce further
claims of lack of capacity. 6 Although in terrorem clauses
may give some peace of mind to the fearful testator, they cannot give the testamentary security established by ante-mortem
proceedings.
4.

Videotaped Will Execution Ceremonies

The fact that the testator cannot be present to testify at
the probate hearing may be the weakest point in post-mortem
systems.69 If the will execution ceremony is preserved on
videotape, the testator is effectively brought into the courtroom during a contest. Of course, the testator is not subject to
cross examination. The videotape evidence may help to
demonstrate the execution of the will, testamentary capacity,
testamentary intent, the70 contents of the will, and lack of undue influence or fraud.
An unaltered videotape is highly accurate, reflecting
66. See Colorado Nat'l Bank v. McCabe, 143 Colo. 21, -, 353 P.2d 385, 392
(1960) (forfeiture provision is not applicable where contest was brought in good faith);
Haynes v. First Nat'l State Bank, 86 N.J. 163, -, 432 A.2d 890, 904 (1981) (in terrorem clause is unenforceable where probable cause exists); Estate of Seymour, 93 N.M.
328, -, 600 P.2d 274, 278 (1979) (bequest is not forfeited where contest is in good faith
and with probable cause based on totality of circumstances); see generally Leavitt, supra
note 64, at 67 n.87 (in terrorem clause penalty is ineffective for beneficiary who contests
a will in good faith with probable cause to contest).
67.. See Estate of Westfahl, 674 P.2d 21, 25 (Okla. 1983) (good faith offer of subsequent will does not invoke forfeiture even though subsequent will was not genuine);
Wadsworth v. Brigham, - Or. -, -, 259 P. 299, 303-04 (1927) (good faith found and
forfeiture not applicable where child filed contest who was not named in will); Estate of
Kubick, 9 Wash. App. 413, -, 513 P.2d 76, 80 (1973) (contestant deemed to have acted
"in good faith and for probable cause" where a suit brought on the advice of a fully
informed attorney); see also Comment, supra note 17, at 845 (the value of an in terrorem
clause is limited by what courts may deem as good faith grounds).
68. Comment, supra note 17, at 845.
69. See supra § IIA & B.
70. See, e.g.,
Beyer, Videotaping the Will Execution Ceremony-Preventing Frustration of the Testator's Final Wishes, 15 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1, 5-7 (1983); Buckley &
Buckley, Videotaping Wills: A New Frontier inEstate Planning, 11 OHIo N.U.L. REV.
271, 278-80 (1984); Nash, A Videowill: Safe and Sure, A.B.A. J. Oct. 1984 at 87, 87-89.
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events exactly as they occurred and eliminating the necessity
of relying upon witnesses whose memories fade and impressions change as time passes."' The tape also preserves valuable, non-verbal evidence such as demeanor, tone of voice,
inflections, facial expressions, and gestures. However, this
technique is not fool proof. The taping process entails additional costs. In addition, the tape may be altered or destroyed
or even used to show the testator lacked the necessary capacity to make a valid will. 72
Despite the tremendous benefits of a videotaped will execution ceremony under a post-mortem probate system, it pales
in comparison to ante-mortem probate. During an antemortem probate proceeding, the actual testator is available for
direct observation. The testator may be carefully examined,
both physically and psychologically, and questioned prior to a
ruling on his capacity and freedom from undue influence
among other considerations.
Ill.

EVOLUTION OF ANTE-MORTEM PROBATE
A.

Biblical

In many respects, ante-mortem probate is not a product
of this century or even the previous one. One can find ancient
laws and customs recorded in the Bible where a type of living
validity of a will was used to facilitate inheritance. Several
examples illustrate Biblical accounts of the unquestionable
right of inheritance given before the death of the decedent.
Perhaps the most celebrated example can be found in the
Book of Ruth in the Old Testament. 7 ' The customs of the
time dictated that Ruth, a young widow, marry the nearest
71.

See McCrystal & Maschari, supra note 22, at 249-52 (1980) (potential inaccu-

racies of human memory create inconsistencies, bias, prejudice, and inaccuracy which
slow the administration of justice).
72. In re Purported Last Will and Testament of Stotlar, No. 1149 (Del. Ch. 1987)
(LEXIS, Del. Library), aff'd without opinion, 542 A.2d 358 (Del. 1988) (videotape of a
will execution ceremony supported a finding of lack of testamentary capacity); In re
Estate of Seegers, 733 P.2d 418, 421-22 (Okla. Ct. App. 1986) (videotape of a will execution ceremony supported a finding of undue influence). See generally Beyer, supra
note 70, t .43-51 (describing potential difficulties with videotaped will execution ceremony); Comment,supra note 17, at 842-44 (describing the potential difficulties of using

will execution videotape).
73. Ruth 1-4."
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eligible kinsman; 74 however, the one marked out for Ruth was
of a different race and did not wish to marry her.75 Boaz, a
gentle and compassionate, man wished to marry Ruth.76
Under the law regarding her deceased husband's estate, the
first son born to a childless widow would inherit the first husband's property. To facilitate Boaz's marriage to Ruth and
resolve the inheritance problems, Boaz went before the elders
with the kinsman who had the first right to marry Ruth and to
claim the estate. They made a legal contract, evidenced by the
passing of a shoe whereby the kinsman gave all rights of the
first husband's estate to Boaz.77
Another example is found in the book of Genesis. During the time of Isaac, a father passed his inheritance to his
78
eldest son by blessing the son near the end of the father's life.
Through an act of trickery and deceit, Jacob, a younger son,
wearing a sheepskin to appear hairy like the elder son Essau,
received the irrevocable blessing.7 9 One might view Jacob as a
leader in using a living probate. In addition, when Jacob's
eldest son, Rueben, shamed him by engaging in sexual relations with his concubine, ° Jacob disinherited Rueben despite
the laws of primogeniture. 81
B.

English Common Law

There is evidence in the early development of English ecclesiastical law that a testament could be proved during the
testator's lifetime at the testator's request. 82 Upon the testator's petition, the testament would be recorded and registered83
but would not be delivered under the seal of the Ordinary
with a probate and would have no effect until the testator ac74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 3:12-13.
Id. at 4:6.
Id. at 3:9-12.
Id. at 4:7-10.
Genesis 27:1-4.
Id. at 27:5-38.

80. Id. at 35:1-22.
81.

Id. at 35:22; 49:3-4.

82. See H. SWINBURNE, A TREATISE OF TESTAMENTS AND LAST WILLS Part 6,
§ 13, at 65-66 (1635) (photograph reprint 1979).
83. An Ordinary is "[o]ne who had exempt and immediate jurisdiction in causes
ecclesiastical."

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 989 (5th ed. 1979).
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tually died. 4 A will so recorded and registered could still be
revoked or altered by the testator. s5 There appears to be little
evidence of the effect of a pre-death registration on the disgruntled heirs' ability to contest the testament after the testator's death. As the law evolved, pre-death procedures were
abandoned and Ecclesiastical Courts were deemed to have jurisdiction only over the probate of deceased persons' wills.8 6
C.

European Civil law

While the Anglo-American legal system wrestled with
problems triggered by post-mortem probate, the civil law systems of Europe developed the "authenticated will" which is
executed before a quasi-judicial officer called a notary.87
Under the European notarial procedure, testators who are
fearful of post-mortem contests can execute a will during their
lifetime and have in their possession both the executed will as
well as evidence of their capacity. 8 Unlike notaries in the
United States, European notaries hold a much higher position
within the legal system.8 9 The European or civil notary is a
quasi-judicial officer, usually an attorney, who is experienced
at determining the capacity of and influence upon the testator
when the will is made. 9° Once the notary authenticates the
84. See H. SWINBURNE, supra note 82, at 65-66.
85. Id.
86. See Allen v. Dundas, 3 T.R. 125, 130 (1789).
87. See Langbein, supra note 34, at 65. See generally Brown, The Office of the
Notary in France,2 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 60, 66-71 (1953) (distinguishes notarie(notary)
from French barrister avoue (organizes written argument)).
88. See Langbein, supra note.34, at 63-71 (1978) (though not the only means of
creating a valid will, the use of notaries is expensive and seldom used).
89. See id. at 70 (European notaries are fully qualified lawyers and sworn officers
of the State); see also Brown, supra note 87, at 60, 62 (a notary must comply with
specific conditions of admission). French notaries are divided into three classes:
"1) those practicing within the ressort or area of jurisdiction of a cour d'appel; 2) those
practicing within the ressort of a tribunal de premi6r6 instance; and 3) those practicing
within the ressort of a tribunal de paix." Id. at 61. The conditions for admission as a
notary are that the applicant 1) is a French citizen, 2) has served his military obligation,
3) is over 25 years of age, 4) has served the necessary apprenticeship duty in a notaries
office, 5) has passed the professional examination, and 6) has received favorable commendation from the President of the Chamber of Discipline on the applicant's moral
fitness. Id. at 62. Additionally the notary must amass considerable wealth to begin his
practice or buy an existing practice because every notary must have a separate charge.
Id. He cannot work in partnership or be employed by another. Id.
90. See Langbein, supra note 34, at 63-71 (1978) (a continental notary is obliged to
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will, it is given great credibility rendering it difficult to set
aside in post-mortem proceedings. 91
When a will is deposited with a notary, strict guidelines
govern the revocability of the instrument. 92 This act discourages alteration or revocation of the will which, in turn, increases the instrument's credibility.93 Therefore, the
European authenticated will is generally immune from contest. 94 Although each country has different laws dealing with
the authentication of wills, 95 those which employ the civil notarial system offer a valuable lesson in resolving problems in
our post-mortem systems.
Of the proposals for ante-mortem probate raised in the
United States during the 1930s,96 many were vaguely based on
the civil notarial system of authenticated wills. This method
tends to avoid the conflict of adversarial positions while providing the testator and his will with validity and credibility.
satisfy himself of the testator's compliance with will formalities and the testator's identity when examining submitted authenticated testation).
91. See id. (European law attaches an extremely strong presumption of validity to
notary's authentication on premise that the notary is an expert in legal paperwork Nvho
takes statutory responsibilities seriously). There are four requirements .of an acte
authentique within the French system:
1) that a public authority or officer has presided at its making;
2) that the acte appertains to the attributes of the public authority or officer
who has made or received it;
3) that the authority or officer has the right to practice in the place where,
and at the time when, the acte is passed, [and]
4) that the acte is clothed with all requisite formalities.
Brown, supra note 89, at 65. Thus, a notary's acte is conclusive evidence until it is
impeached for falsity and is executory in itself. Id.
92. See Langbein, supra note 34, at 69 (a notary keeps the document in his possession to discourage ineffective experiments of altering will and to prevent tampering or
forgery after document is notarized).
93. See id. (a notarial deposit discourages the ineffective attempts of the testator to
alter or revoke the will and to prevent accidental destruction, outright forgery, or unauthorized tampering after the document is authenticated).
94. See id. at 65-66, 70 (a notary must satisfy himself of the testator's capacity to
make will as a prerequisite to receive or transcribe the document; thus, the will is
granted a presumption of validity due to status of notary as expert in legal paperwork).
95. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 89, at 60-71 (1953) (specifying the duties of a
French notary. in certifying a will as distinguished from the barrister, an avocat who
presents only oral arguments to court for his client and the avou6, a public official who
may make known to the court his client's complaint in written and authenticated form);
4 MODERN LEGAL SYSTEM CYCLOPEDIA 114 (K. Redden ed. 1984) (the differences
and effects of Nonegasque law (Moroccan) in succession).
96. See infra § III(G).
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At a minimum, the European experience with ante-mortem
probate is evidence that ante-mortem systems do work and
that security, not present with the post-mortem process, is
available.
D.

Michigan Statute of 1883

In 1883, the Michigan legislature made a novel attempt
to cope with the disruptive and uncertain post-mortem will
97
contest by enacting one of the earliest ante-mortem statutes.
The testator was authorized to petition the probate judge of
the testator's county of residence asking for the will to be admitted and established as his last will and testament. 9 The
petition was required to contain averments that the will was
executed by the testator "without fear, fraud, impartiality, or
undue influence, and with a full knowledge of its contents." 99
In addition, the testator was required to allege that he was of
sound mind and memory and had full testamentary capacity.'°° Accompanying the statements relating to the will's validity, the statute required the testator to supply the names
and addresses of the individuals who would be the testator's
heirs were he to die intestate and other persons whom the testator desired to be parties to the proceeding.101
The judge would then set a hearing date and issue citations to the parties named in the petition as well as direct that
notice of the hearing be published.10 2 After receiving proof
that the citations were served and the notice published, the
judge would conduct a hearing resembling a post-mortem probate proceeding. 03 At the hearing, the judge would inquire
into all matters alleged in the petition. In addition, he was
granted the authority to examine witnesses to ascertain rele97. See 1883 Mich. Pub. Acts 17. The text of the act is set forth in Fink, supra
note 16, at 268-69 (reproduced in Appendix A).

98. 1883 Mich. Pub. Acts 17, § 1.
99. Id. §2.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. § 3.
103. Id. If any person named in the testator's petition was a minor or under a
disability, the judge was required to appoint a guardian ad litem to represent them. Id.

§ 4.
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vant facts.'o
If the judge determined that the testator's allegations
05
were true, he would issue a decree setting forth his findings. 1
A copy of the decree would be attached to the will and certified under seal of the court.106 This decree would have the
same effect as a post-mortem decree and would be conclusive
as to the matters stated therein.0 7 The judge's decision was
appealable in the same manner as a post-mortem probate decree. 108 No restrictions were placed on the ability of the testator to revoke or alter the will.'nor was re-use of the antemortem procedure required. 0 9
The usefulness of this innovative statute was short-lived.
When Lloyd, a testator, presented his will for probate under
the statute, the Michigan Supreme Court heard the case and
declared the statute unconstitutional. 10 Two grounds were
propounded for the statute's invalidity: (1) It enabled the testator to avoid the rights of a spouse and child; and (2) it failed
to provide for finality of judgment."' One commentator has
argued that the statute failed due to its poor drafting because
ii only provided for notice by citation to the heirs or other
persons named in the petition." 12 The court specifically noted
the statute's failure to provide notice and an opportunity to be
heard by the testator's wife. 113 An additional weakness of the
statute was its policy of determining a will to be valid, yet
reserving in the testator the power to amend, revoke, or alter
the will. The power of the testator to change the adjudicated
will was fatal because it did not provide for finality Of a
104.

Id. §4.

105.

Id.

106.
107.

Id.
Id.

108.
109.

Id. § 5.
Id. § 6.

110.
111.

Lloyd v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 56 Mich. 236, 239, 23 N.W. 28, 29 (1885).
Id. at 238-39, 23 N.W. at 28-29; see also Comment, supra note 17, at 826-34

(discussion of Lloyd and current proposals to overcome its criticisms).
112. See Comment, supra note 17, at 827 (although inchoate rights, such as.dower
and appointment of guardian for minors, are statutorily protected, Michigan statute did
not require notice to wife before probate); see also Fink, supra note 16, at 269 (notice by
citation provision was "self serving at best").
113.

Lloyd, 56 Mich. at 239, 23 N.W. at 29.

.
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judgment.' 14
Judge Campbell, in a concurring opinion, advocated the
rejection of ante-mortem probate outright. He stated that
"the living can have no heirs" and noted that the will cannot
be final until the death of the testator. ' 5 He felt that to deny
this concept of law would undermine the ambulatory nature
of a will. "1 6 Judge Campbell also expressed concern about the

possible harm to a family which may flow from the antemortem process. 7
Another commentator has suggested that the criticisms
of the statute in Lloyd fall into four basic categories and that
subsequent ante-mortem statutes have been cautiously drafted
to avoid these pitfalls."' Other commentators, while acknowledging these criticisms, feel that the primary reason the
statute was overruled was the court's belief that the process
established was not a judicial one. '
At the time Lloyd was decided, the court did not perceive
any adverse parties to the proceeding because the defendants
were the presumptive heirs who had no legal interest in the
outcome of the proceeding.' 20 This problem arose because the
proceeding lacked finality. The testator was free to revoke or
change the will after the proceeding leaving his heirs uncertain as to whether they would be recipients at his death. This
dilemma led to the criticism that the living could have no
heirs.' 2 ' This concept prevented the proceeding from satisfying the constitutional test for jurisdiction which requires that
courts hear only controversies between conflicting parties of
114. See Comment, supra note 17, at 827.
115. Lloyd, 56 Mich. at 240-41, 23 N.W. at 30; see also Comment, supra note 5, at
719 n.19 (unfounded challenges to post-mortem probate are motivated by monetary
concerns or less worthy motivations arising out of embarrassment or anger when an
heir receives little or nothing).
116. Lloyd, 56 Mich. at 241, 23 N.W. at 30-31.
117. Id. at 241-42, 23 N.W. at 30 (disappointed heirs would quarrel with testator).
118. Comment, supra note 5, at 719 n.19 (categories of criticisms are (1) the finality
of judgment; (2) inchoate rights; (3) living have no heirs; and (4) the security of the
testator).
119. Edwards, Antemortem Probateand Judicial Power to Render or Refuse Declaratory Relief, 7 OHIo N.U.L. REV. 189, 189-91 (1980).
120. Lloyd, 56 Mich. at 239, 23 N.W. at 28-29; see also Edwards, supra note 119, at
190.
121. Lloyd, 56 Mich. at 240, 23 N.W. at 30 (Campbell, J., concurring).
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interest.'22 The Lloyd court felt that allowing a judicial determination in such a situation would be paramount to issuing an
advisory opinion which was prohibited by Michigan's
constitution.

23

In 1937, the United States Supreme Court spoke to clarify the issue of a court's authority to issue a declaratory opinion. 124 By its decision, the Court ratified the Declaratory
Judgment Act and gave a new spark of hope for ante-mortem
solutions to post-mortem problems.
E.

Use of Declaratory Judgments

When the Michigan Supreme Court held that the 1883
ante-mortem statute was unconstitutional, reliance was placed
on the controlling law of the time which set forth the prerequisite of a "case or controversy" before judicial power could
be invoked. 125 The court stated that a will could not be declared judicially valid when the testator could later revoke or
modify the same instrument. Therefore, a judicial declaration
would not create the level of finality required of proper judicial determinations. 26 In 1885, declaratory judgments were
considered to be outside the realm of judicial competence.
Even as late as 1920, the Michigan Declaratory Judgment Act
was held to be unconstitutional for authorizing judicial opinions. 2 The courts were still being strangled in their role as
conflict resolvers, having to wait until a situation had erupted
122. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96 (1968) (federal law of justiciability prohibits issuance of advisory opinions); Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U.S. 70, 75
(1927) (no justiciable controversy based on uncertain or hypothetical set of facts).
123. Lloyd, 56 Mich. at 239, 23 N.W. at 29 (no authority exists for circuit court to
decide cases not properly judicial).
124. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 244 (1937) (upholding constitutionality of Declaratory Judgment Act).
125. Lloyd, 56 Mich. at 239, 23 N.W. at 29 (petitioner erroneously assumed judgment was final although testator could change will at any time violating case or controversy requirement).
126. Id.; see also Edwards, supra note 119, at 189-91 (no finality of judgment where
the testator remains free to modify or revoke judicially valid will).
127. See Anway v. Grand Rapids Ry. Co., 211 Mich. 592, -, 179 N.W. 350, 36061 (1920) (the court cannot answer abstract questions of law under the Declaratory
Judgment Act because it does not confer judicial power to answer such questions; required performance of nonjudicial acts prohibited by Michigan Constitution). After the
Michigan Legislature redrafted the Declaratory Judgment Act in 1929, the Act was
found to be constitutional. See Washington-Detroit Theater Co. v. Moore, 249 Mich.
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into a full-blown controversy before offering peaceable
solutions.
In 1937, the United States Supreme Court broke the
shackles restraining judicial involvement by clarifying what
constitutes a "controversy." In Aetna Life Insurance Co. v.
Haworth,1 28 the Court held that the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act (FDJA) did not create new substantive rights;
rather, the FDJA was a procedural tool for dealing with controversies in the constitutional sense. 129 On this latter point,
the Court said:
A controversy in this sense must be one that is appropriate for judicial determination... A justiciable controversy
is thus distinguished from one that is academic or moot
...The controversy must be definite and concrete touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests ... It must be a real and substantial controversy
admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising
what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of
facts. 130
This development opened the door to the use of declaratory
judgments when a court made a determination regarding the
validity of a will and legal rights stemming from it. Yet, three
other issues still needed clarification after declaratory judgments were approved before drafters could solve the antemortem puzzle with a declaratory solution: 1) the require1 31
ments of "ripeness, sufficiency and adversity of the parties;"
2) an actual concrete controversy; and 3) finality of 'the
judgment. 132
673, -, 229 N.W. 618, 621 (1930) (redrafting eliminated prior constitutional
infirmities).
128. 300 U.S. 229, 240-41 (1937) (a controversy must be definite and concrete,
touching legal rights of parties with adverse legal interests).
129. Id. at 240; Edwards, supra note 119, at 191.
130.

Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 229, 240-41 (1937) (citations

omitted).
131. For example, can a person have the validity of his will examined if there is no
one of record opposing his doing so? If the answer is no, then the testator would be
refused such determination and, provided the would-be heir keeps quiet until the testator's death, an heir could then use the testator's repetitive attempts to validate his will
by ante-mortem procedures to indicate his lack of capacity.
132. Edwards, supra note 119, at 192 (Ohio Declaratory Judgment Act imposes
similar limitations parallel to federal constitutional requirements).
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Several states have attempted to overcome these proce133
dural hurdles by enacting specific' ante-mortem, legislation.
Other jurisdictions, despite adoption of statutes authorizing
declaratory judgments,134 do not grant jurisdiction to any specific court to determine the validity of a living testator's
136
will. 135 For example, in the Texas case of Cowan v. Cowan,
133. See infra § V(A), (B), & (C) discussing the statutes of North Dakota, Ohio,
and Arkansas.
134. See UNIF. DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACT §§ 1-17 (1975). The Uniform
Declaratory Judgments Act has been adopted in 40 states. See ALA. CODE §§ 6-6-220
to -232 (1977); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-1831 to -1846 (West 1982); ARK. CODE
ANN. §§ 16-1111-101 to -111 (1987); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-51-101 to -115 (1987);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 6501-6503 (Supp. 1988); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 86.011-. 111
(West 1987); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-4-1 to -10 (1982); IDAHO CODE §§ 10-1201 to -1217
(1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-701 (Smith-Hurd 1983); IND. CODE ANN.
§§ 34-4-10-1 to -16 (Burns 1986); LA. CODE CIv. PROC. ANN. arts. 1871-1883 (West
1961); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 5951-5963 (1980); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC.
CODE ANN. §§ 3-401 to -415 (1984); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 231A, §§ 1-9 (Law. Co-op.
1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 555.01-.16 (West 1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 527.010-.140
(Vernon 1953 & Supp. 1988); MONT. CODE ANN. 27-8-101 to -313 (1987); NEB. REV.
STAT. §§ 25-21,149 to ,164 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 30.010-.160 (1987); N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 2A:16-50 to -62 (West 1978); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-6-1 to -15 (1978); N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 1-253 to -267 (1988); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-23-01 to -13 (1976);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2721.01-.15 (Baldwin 1984); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§§ 1651-1657 (West 1980); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 28.010-.160 (1983); 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 7531-7541 (Purdon 1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-30-1 to -16 (1985); S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 15-53-10 to -140 (Law. Co-op. 1977); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§§ 21-24-1 to -16 (1987); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-14-101 to -113 (1980); TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 37.001-.011 (Vernon 1986); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 7833-1 to -13 (1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 4711-4725 (1973); VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 8.01-184 to -191 (1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 7.24.010-.144 (1961); W. VA.
CODE §§ 55-13-1 to -16 (1981); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 806.04 (West 1977 & Supp. 1988);
WYO. STAT. §§ 1-37-101 to -115 (1988); see also IOWA R. Civ. P. 261-269. Two United
States territories have also adopted this uniform act. See P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 32, App.
III, Rule 59 (1984); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 5, §§ 1261-1272 (1967).
135. But see Richardson v. First Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 419 S.W.2d 836, 837-38 (Tex.
1967) (residual jurisdiction exists solely in Texas district courts only where remedy or
jurisdiction is not provided for by law or by constitution); Shelvin v. Lykos, 741 S.W.2d
178, 186 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (Evans, C.J., dissenting) (the trial court did not have
constitutional jurisdiction to order taking and testing of blood because jurisdiction had
not been granted by the Texas Constitution, law, or other authority). The concept of
residual jurisdiction vests a particular court of the state with general exclusive jurisdiction over causes of action for which jurisdiction is not given to any other court by
constitutional decree or statutory delegation. See Super X Drugs v. State, 505 S.W.2d
333, 336 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974). Once jurisdiction attaches, the district court is empowered to hear and determine the controversy and carry to execution the judgment of the
court. Cleveland v. Ward, 116 Tex. 1, 9, 285 S.W. 1063, 1069 (1926). The basis for
residual jurisdiction in Texas exists in both the Constitution and statute. See TEX.
CONST. art. V, § 8 (1891, amended 1985); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 24.008 (Vernon
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two children asked that their mother's will be declared invalid
through a declaratory judgment proceeding. The applicable
Texas statute provided that an interested person under a will
could have a court determine questions regarding the validity
of the instrument. 1 7 Despite the apparently direct language
of the Texas statute, the beneficiary of the will argued that
jurisdiction could not be awakened in any Texas court to determine the purported will's validity because the testatrix was
still living. 138 In spite of the language expressed in the statute,
the appellate court held:
Prior to the enactment of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, no court in Texas had the power to determine
the validity of the will of a person still alive, nor in our
opinion, does any court in this state now have that jurisdiction [after the enactment of the act]. I3 9
The Texas court, as justification of its holding, went on to
quote the well known maxim that "[u]ntil a man dies it is not
known who his heirs will be. ..

"4

Referring to the Lloyd

case, the court reiterated that judicial power is confined to
controversies between conflicting parties in interest and that
the ripeness requirement could never exist between a living
man and his possible heirs.' 4 ' Absent a statute expressly con-

ferring such jurisdiction, the court held that there was no judicial authority to hear a suit to establish or annul the will of a
living person. 142
1988). Although the explicit language of the 1891 Constitution providing for residual
jurisdiction was deleted by the 1985 amendment, the proposed change was for simplification purposes only. See 1985 TEX. GEN. LAWS 3357, 3357-58. The Texas Government Code currently provides that "[tlhe district court may hear and determine any
cause that is cognizable by courts of law or equity and may grant any relief that could
be granted by either courts of law or equity." TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 24.008
(Vernon 1988). As long as the elements mandated by a declaratory judgment are met,
the district court provides the proper forum for adjudicating the rights of a testator in
an ante-mortem proceeding.
136. 254 S.W.2d 862 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
137. UNIF. DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACT, ch. 164, §§ 1-17 (1943); 1943 TEX.

GEN. LAWS 265, 265-66, repealed by Act of May 17, 1985, ch. 959,

§ 9(1), reprintedin

1985 TEX. GEN. LAWS 3242, 3322 (now codified at TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE

ANN. §§ 37.003-.004 (Vernon 1986)).
138. Cowan, 254 S.W.2d at 863.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.

142. Id.
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The court also discussed whether the declaratory judgment statute conferred authority upon Texas courts to determine a person's interests under the will of a living person and
stated that the statute did not create any new substantive
rights because it viewed the act as "only remedial in nature
and procedural in character." '4 3 Hence, the statute did not
give Texas courts jurisdiction over matters not within jurisdictional limits prior to the statute's enactment. Rather, the statute only granted a new method of exercising existing
jurisdiction."' The court concluded that the matter in Cowan
was not justiciable; therefore, it should be dismissed.' 45
As a result of Cowan, Texas lawmakers, like those in
many other states, were faced with overcoming the steadily
solidifying principle that no one has an interest in a will before
the testator's death. 146 Until a justiciable interest or issue is
present, neither the probate nor district court could have jurisdiction. 47 Although declaratory judgments seemed to offer
the courts the ability to begin an ante-mortem probate system,
courts were not anxious to adopt the use of declaratory judgments in the context of pre-death probate. It seemed that a
statute or perhaps a constitutional amendment expressly giving jurisdiction
to the courts to hear ante-mortem cases would
48
required.'
be
F.

Wills of American Indians

In 19 10, Congress enacted a kind of ante-mortem probate
applicable to certain Indian tribes under the guardianship of
the federal government.' 49 This procedure permitted an In143.

Id. at 864.

144.

Id. (the act is procedural only and offers no new jurisdiction).

145. Id. at 865.
146. See 57 AM. JUR. Wills § 765 (1948) (absence of parties in interest results from
maxim that a living person has no heirs or legatees).
147. See id. (public policy makes void any attempt to compel testator to "enter
upon a contest of his will" with individuals who are devoid of any interest in testator's
estate until his death).
148. See Cowan v. Cowan, 254 S.W.2d 862, 863 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) (absent a
statute expressly conferring judicial power on a particular court, Texas courts do not
possess power to determine living testator's will) (citing 57 AM. JUR. Wills § 765
(1948)).
149. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 431, § 1, 36 Stat. 886 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 373
(Supp. 1988)).
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dian whose will disposed of certain allotments held under
trust by the government to have the Secretary of the Interior
approve his will prior to death. 150 The Secretary of the Interior was under a duty to "ascertain whether the Indian's signature [was] genuine, to make a full investigation into the
mental competency of the testator and of all circumstances
which induced its execution, and where natural heirs [were]
cut off he must ascertain the reason."' " The Secretary's approval was final unless fraud was discovered in connection
with the execution or procurement of the will within one year
after the testator's death.152 A contemporary commentator
heralded this advancement as demonstrating the practicality
5 3
and value of ante-mortem probate.
The potential for extensive development of this antemortem technique, however, was never realized. Although
the 1915 regulations governing the Interior Department's approval of wills provided little guidance as to ante-mortem proceedings,' 54 the 1923 regulations indicated that the preferred
practice was not to approve a will before the testator's
death. 155 In the event that an Indian submitted a will during
his lifetime, the Office of the Interior was only to examine the
form of the will and return it to the Superintendent who
would retain the will until the testator's death. At the death
of the testator, the will would be resubmitted for consideration. 15 This restriction on any true ante-mortem probate has
150. Id.
151.

Lewis, Ante Mortem Probate of Wills and Testaments, 50 AM. L. REV. 742,

744 (1916).
152.

Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 431, § 1, 36:Stat. 855, 855-56 (codified at 25 U.S.C.

§ 373 (Supp. 1988)); Lewis, supra note 151, at 744.
153. Lewis, supra note 151, at 744 ("These Indian wills possibly present the only
instance of the ante-mortem system but they seem to demonstrate its practicability and
its value.").
154. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, UNITED STATES INDIAN SERVICE, DETERMINATION OF HEIRS AND APPROVAL OF WILLS, § 3 (1915) [hereinafter DEPARTMENT
OF THE INTERIOR], reprintedin W. FRANCISCO, FEDERAL INDIAN PROBATE LAW 150,

151 (1979) (mere mention that Secretary of Interior may approve will before testator's
death).
155. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 154, at § 37, reprinted in W.
FRANCISCO, supra note 154, at 170. See generally id.at 60 (discussing how 1923 Regu-

lations limited practice of approving wills prior to testator's death).
156. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 154, at § 37, reprinted in W.
FRANCISCO, supra note 154, at 170.
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been continued by subsequent regulations.1 57
G.

Renewed Interest in the 1930s

After a period of disenchantment followed by disinterest,
ante-mortem probate was revived in the 1930s. The National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws created
a special committee to draft a uniform act to establish wills
before the death of the testator.1 8 The Committee proposed
two methods. The first permitted the testator simply to file
the will for safe keeping with the clerk of the court.' 59 The
second method, described below, was a true ante-mortem probate procedure.1 60
The first tentative draft of the act which delineated the
true ante-mortem probate, procedure provided that the testator could initiate the ante-mortem process by filing his will in
a package under seal with the clerk of the court together with
a list of the witnesses to the will.16 ' The testator would then
supply a petition naming his spouse and prospective heirs as
defendants. 162 Assuming the petition was filed in a court with
appropriate jurisdiction, the court would issue service of process to the named defendants. 63 If any process was returned
unserved, notice by publication would be substituted."M
.157. See 43 C.F.R. § 4.260(b) (1988) (current regulation regarding care of an Indian's will). The current provision states in part:
When an Indian executes a will and submits the same to the Superintendent of
the Agency, the Superintendent shall forward it to the Office of the Solicitor
for examination as to adequacy ofform, and for submission by the Office of the
Solicitor to the Superintendent of any appropriate comments. The will or codicil or any replacement or copy thereof may be retained by the Superintendent

at the request of the testator or testatrix for safekeeping. A will shall be held
in absolute confidence, and no person other than the testator shall admit its
existence or divulge its contents prior to the. death of the testator."
Id. (emphasis added).
158. Martin, Report ofSpecial Committee on Uniform Act to Establish Wills Before
Death of Testator,.9 A.L.I. PROC. 463 (1932).

159.

Id.

160.

Id. The Committee's research indicated that no state currently had a true

ante-mortem procedure. Id. at 464.
161. First Tentative Draft of Uniform Act to Establish Wills before Death of Testator § 2(b), 9 A.L.I. PROC. 465 (1932).
162.

Id. § 3. The form statute also contained a form for the testator to use. Id.

163.

Id.

164. Id. The court would appoint a guardian ad litem for minors and those under a
disability. Id.
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After proper notice was given, a hearing would be conducted to determine whether the will should be admitted to
ante-mortem probate.165 If the will was admitted, the testator
would be
conclusively presumed to have executed the writing as and
for his will as of the said filing, without fear, fraud, importunity or undue influence, and with a full knowledge of its
contents, and that he was of sound mind and memory and
full testamentary capacity and that he executed the same
in the presence of each of the witnesses who signed the
will as a witness, in the presence and at the request of the
testator and in the presence of each of the other witnesses
and that it66 was sealed in the presence of all of the
witnesses. 1
Any aggrieved party would have the right to appeal the
court's judgment. 167 If the testator Wished to revoke the will,
he could either file a written withdrawal which automatically
revoked the will, 168 or make a written revocation in a subsequent will or codicil. 169 There was no requirement that this
action be brought to the court's attention.17°
However, this tentative draft was not met with a positive
response. One commentator believes that the Committee's
work was undermined from the beginning because of objections that the proposal would place the Commissioners "in the
position of advocating new legislation rather than reforming
current legislation."171
The concept of ante-mortem probate also received considerable support in the writings of legal commentators in the
early 1930s. 72 The most significant was a 1934 article by
Duke University Professor David F. Cavers 173 which made
165.

Id.

166.
167.
168.

Id. § 2.
Id. § 3.
Id. § 4. A form withdrawal was also supplied for the testator's use.

169.

Id.

170.

Id.

171.

Fink, supra note 16, at 289 (citing

HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFER-

ENCE OF COMMISSIONERS AND UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS,

at 143

(1931)).
172. See, e.g., Redfearn, supra note 8, at 571; Cavers, supra note 7, at 440; Kutscher, Living Probate, 21 A.BA. J. 427 (1935).
173. Cavers, supra note 7, at 440.
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suggestions to avoid problems previously associated with antemortem probate. 174 Cavers suggested that a will accompanied
by a description of those persons being the next of kin or parties dependent upon the testator could be submitted to a "Probate Officer.' ' 75 The plan also called for the filing of a
scriveners affidavit, as well as affidavits from three disinterested witnesses who would comment on the testator's capacity, the circumstances under which the will was drafted, and
the existence of potential undue influence. 76 After considering the affidavits and interviewing the declarants and testator,
the Probate Officer would then decide to allow or disallow
ante-mortem probate. 1 77 Testators who were refused antemortem consideration would be relegated to the traditional
post-mortem process. Those for whom ante-mortem probate
was allowed would have all of the evidence necessary to effectuate their dispositive plans. The will and appropriate affidavits would be sealed and kept with the court for future use as a
shield against unfounded contests in the post-mortem
period.7
Cavers's approach was typical of other attempts at antemortem probate which sprang up during the 1930s in that his
approach attempted to correct the infirmities laid out in
Lloyd. In addition, his approach tried to reduce the common
problems with the post-mortem process. 7 9 Cavers's approach
reduced the judicial interest complaint by removing the process from the adversarial arena and placing the evidence gathered in an administrative safe-house for the pending judicial
battle. 80 Although the Cavers model did not solve the problem of the revocable will, revocation was made more diffi174.

See id. at 446-48 (suggesting the appointment of probate officer to determine

validity of testator's will).
175. Id. at 446.
176. Id.
177. See id. (if witnesses' opinions were inadequate to show testamentary capacity,
a further opportunity should be given to the testator to furnish more qualified witnesses

at a later hearing).
178. Id. at 447.
179. See, e.g., Cavers, supra note 7, at 440; Hulbert, Probate Psychiatry-A NeroPsychiatric Examination of Testators from the Psychiatric Viewpoint, 25 ILL. B.J. 288
(1930); Kutscher, supra note 172, at 427; Redfearn, supra note 8, at 571.
180. Cavers, supra note 7, at 440.
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cult.'' However, Cavers's approach has been criticized
recently as denying potential intestate successors and other interested persons the8 2right to challenge the testamentary capacity of the testator.
Several other authors also wrote on ante-mortem probate
during the 1930s. 8 3 For example, one commentator essentially supported the program which Cavers proposed by endorsing the civil law practice of authentication. 84 However,
this system exists without the dependency
on the collateral
18 5
attack available in a post-mortem contest.
H.

Proposals for the Model and Uniform Probate Codes

During the early 1940s, the drafters of the Model Probate
Code (MPC) gave brief consideration to the possibility of including provisions for ante-mortem probate. 8 6 The introduction to the MPC explains in terse language how the drafters
carefully considered ante-mortem probate and concluded that
"[tihe practical advantages of such a device are not great in
181. Id. at 447-48. Cavers suggests alteration or revocation of the will by reapplication for ante-mortem probate, by preparation of a properly executed will utilized in
post-mortem proceeding, or by operation of law on traditional grounds. Id. at 447.
While opportunity should be given to an individual to attack the proceeding on grounds
similar to an action to set aside a judgment, a challenge to the ante-mortem proceeding
itself would be difficult. To sustain such a challenge, the plaintiff would need to prove a
court has jurisdiction to decide matters regarding non-judicial proceedings, prove fraud
or influence of the examiner, show the witnesses made substantial misstatements of fact
(not opinion) or that the witnesses were impersonated by individuals without actual
knowledge of the testator. Id.
182. See Fink, supra note 16, at 288 (intestate successors "who have the most to
lose" would not be contacted as to proceedings and they would be unable to challenge
testamentary capacity of testator).
183. See, e.g., Hulbert, supra note 179, at 288; Kutscher, supra note 172, at 427;
Redfearn, supra note 8, at 571.
184. Kutscher, supra note 172, at 427 (suggesting continued use of authentication
used by civil systems).
185. Id. at 429. Kutscher noted that use of ante-mortem probate would virtually
eliminate post-morter contests for challenges regarding the veracity of the testator's
signature, the testator's capacity to make a will, or fraud in fact. Id. Other common
post-mortem challenges such as undue influence, fraud in the inducement, or lack of
mental competency would greatly decrease if not eliminate these questions due to the
presumption of regularity attached to the ante-mortem proceeding. Id.; see also Fink,
supra note 16, at 289-90 (use of ante-mortem probate greatly decreases will contests,
especially "laughing heir" contests).
186. L. SIMES & P.BASYE, PROBLEMS IN PROBATE LAW 20 (1946) (containing
text of MODEL PROBATE CODE).
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view of the fact that few testators would wish to encounter the
187
publicity involved in such a proceeding."'
In the early stages of the development of the Uniform
Probate Code (UPC), the drafters again gave serious consideration to inclusion of an ante-mortem procedure. 188 The procedure faired better than the earlier MPC version as evidenced
by the summer 1967 draft which contained provisions permitting the testator to petition the court "for an order declaring
that his Will has been duly executed and is his valid Will subject only to subsequent revocation." 18 9 This action would be
declaratory in nature and would allow the testator to revoke
the submitted will by a simple withdrawal or by a subsequent
written will or codicil. 190
The comments which accompanied the proposed sections
reflected the benefits of ante-mortem probate. For example,
one comment stated that ante-mortem probate is "often recommended and is of considerable attraction to the public. Its
availability offers some insurance against unwarranted Will
contests." ' 191 Despite the initial sanctioning of this progressive
estate planning technique, the drafters omitted any reference
to ante-mortem probate in subsequent drafts of the UPC. 192 It
was not until almost a decade later that a significant resurgence of interest in ante-mortem probate occurred.
IV.

MODERN THEORIES OF ANTE-MORTEM
PROBATE

With the onset of the nation's bicentennial came a resurgence of interest in the field of ante-mortem probate. Between
1976 and 1982, many articles were written expressing both the
advantages and disadvantages of the ante-mortem alternative.' 93 During this period, writers addressed the four criti187.

Id.

188.

W. ROLLISON, COMMENTARY ON THE UNIFORM PROBATE CODE 25 (1970).

189.

Summer, 1967, Draft of the Uniform Probate Code § 2-903, quoted in, W.
supra note 188.

ROLLISON,

190.
191.
192.
193.
mortem

Id. § 2-906, quoted in W. ROLLISON, supra note 188, at 26.
Id.
W. ROLLISON, supra note 188, at 26.
See, e.g., Fink, supra note 16, at 264 (advocating the "contest model" of anteprobate); Langbein, supra note 34, at 63 (advocating the "conservatorship

model" of ante-mortem probate); Alexander & Pearson, Alternative Models of Ante-
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cisms of Lloyd: (1) inchoate rights; (2) the living have no
heirs; (3) the security of the testator; and (4) the lack of enabling legislation. 194 From the above criticisms and difficulties, three basic ante-mortem probate models emerged.
A. The Contest Model
The first model, proposed by Professor Howard Fink of
Ohio State University, is closely related to the Michigan Act
of 1883. This proposal places the testator and the prospective
heirs in an adversarial situation which allows for a declaratory
judgment.' 95 Because of its adversarial nature, this proposal
has been labeled the contest model. 96 The contest model requires that standing be granted to all individuals who would
be heirs by intestate succession as well as to all beneficiaries
under the will. 197 In addition, unborn or unascertained heirs
are protected by the appointment of a guardian ad litem or by
the active protection of others under virtual representation
concepts. 198
After a will is executed under the contest model, the testator would bring suit in a court of competent jurisdiction 99
requesting that the court by declaratory judgment hold the
will valid. To determine the will's validity, the court would
consider the signatures, the number of witnesses to the will,
the absence of undue influence, and the testamentary capacity
of the testator. 200 All parties, including named beneficiaries
and possible intestate successors would be notified of the proceeding.2"' If the court determined that the will was valid, the
Mortem Probate and Procedural Due Process Limitations on Succession, 78 MICH. L.
REV. 89 (1979) (advocating the "administrative model" of ante-mortem probate).
194. See Comment, supra note 17, at 830-32 (Fink's contest model was developed to
respond to the four criticisms of Michigan Supreme Court in Lloyd).
195. Fink, supra note 16, at 274-75 (proposed statute for ante-mortem probate).
196. The label of "contest model" was given to Fink's proposal and similar adversarial judgment-type suggestions in Langbein, supra note 34, at 63.
197. See Fink, supra note 16, at 274-77.
198. See id. at 274-75 (the interests asserted by the beneficiaries and heirs present
would be sufficient to protect those with existing or future interests not present).
199. Assuming that the legislature of the subject state would have designated a
court (i.e., probate), and have given it jurisdiction by statute.
200. See Fink, supra note 16, at 274 (proposed model to remedy weaknesses of
Michigan statute found unconstitutional in Lloyd).

201. See id. at 274-75 (service would only be to those persons known to be within
the state, out of state interest holders would be notified by publication).
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will would be filed with the court. It could be nullified by
repeating the process.2"2 Arkansas, North Dakota, and Ohio
have enacted statutes based on the contest model.2 °3
While Fink's model offers some solutions to the problems
of ante-mortem probate, it is expensive and it leaves many
questions unanswered. 2 " However, the contest model solves
the problem of finality by making the will binding on all parties; it is susceptible to change only by a second judgment.20 5
Disclosure of the will's contents and the adversarial nature of
the procedure which may cause unrest and disharmony befriends of the testator are the proposal's
tween family and
6
greatest flaws.

20

B.

The Conservatorship Model

In 1980, Professor John Langbein of the University of
Chicago attempted to solve the problems of the contest model
with his proposal of the conservatorship model.20 7

Like

Fink's proposal, Langbein relies on a declaratory judgment to
establish finality. 20 This model avoids the harsh sense of
human greed and weakness involved in interfamilial litigation
by appointing a conservator. 20 9 The conservator litigates the

interests of all the prospective heirs and beneficiaries. 210 Unfortunately, the conservatorship model is plagued with the
problems of notice, jurisdictional function, and unrest caused
by public disclosure of the contents of the will. 21 ' Because

202. Id. at 275.
203. See infra § V(A), (B) & (C). The proposal's exclusive intrastate notice provision makes questionable the effect of a judgment on an out-of-state interest holder.

204. See Comment, supra note 17, at 836 (unanswered questions include: security
of will's content from public disclosure; subsequent disinheritance for challenging original will; strain on family due to adversarial nature of proceeding).
205. Fink, supra note 16, at 275.
206. See Comment, supra note 17, at 836 (listing contest model's weaknesses).
207. Langbein, supra note 34, at 63.
208. See id. at 80 (if the court is satisfied that testator has sufficient intent, an antemortem judgment is entered conclusive on the points presented).
209. See id. (appointment of guardian ad litem permits the development of incapacity in closed setting avoiding an exaggerated adversary contest found in traditional postmortem litigation).
210. Id. at 78.
211. See id. at 78-79 (this may create a conflict of interest problem); see also Comment, supra note 17, at 837 (conservatorship model deficiencies include jurisdiction and
public disclosure of will's contents).
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both the Fink and Langbein proposals rely on declaratory
measures for resolution of the validity issues, the contest of
the will under either proposal becomes part of the public record. The repercussions on family life tend to make the proposals poor public policy.212
C.

The Administrative Model

Reflecting a significant departure from the contest and
conservatorship models, University of Georgia Professors
Gregory Alexander and Albert Pearson proposed the implementation of an administrative model of ante-mortem probate. This model envisions a two-step process: (1) the
enactment of empowering legislation; 213 and (2) the revision of
2 14
the statutory conditions on the rights to contest a will.

Under this theory, the ante-mortem experience would be
neither judicial nor adversarial. The administrative model
suggests an ex parte proceeding in which a testator and his
circumstances are considered to answer the question of the
will's validity rather than a system resembling an accelerated
will contest.21 5
The process begins with the testator petitioning the
6
21
proper court for a determination of the validity of the will.

All functions of the court would be in camera and provide the
privacy which is lacking with other models because the will
would not become a matter of public record. 217 Like the con-

servatorship model, a guardian ad litem would be appointed
under the administrative model. However, this guardian
would be an investigating agent of the court rather than a fiduciary of those holding prospective interests in the testator's
estate. 218 Like an investigator, this guardian would privately

interview the testator to determine the existence of undue influence or lack of capacity. 2 9 Under this scheme, the guard212. See Comment, supra note 17, at 837 (discovery of will's contents by heirs during testator's lifetime creates interfamilial tensions).
213. Alexander & Pearson, supra note 193, at 112.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
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ian would not normally be informed of the contents of the
will. The judge could, however, disclose any provisions of the
will which are unusual, for example, those that disinherit
close relatives or make large gifts to charity, so the guardian
would be able to conduct a thorough investigation.22 °
This administrative proposal eliminates the necessity of
giving notice of the proceeding to anyone except the guardian
ad litem,221 on the pretence that prospective heirs have no
constitutional right to notice. Their potential interest in the
testator's estate, were he to die intestate, is too weak to require
notice. However, family members could receive indirect notice of the ante-mortem probate proceedings should they become aware of the guardian ad litem's investigation.
A determination by the court that the declarant is of
sound mind and is acting free from undue influence does not
determine the rights of persons having a potential interest in
the estate. Therefore, the product of the process would be an
order declaring the will free from testamentary defects and
duly executed.2 2 2 The authors of this proposal assert that because the right to contest the suggested proceeding is statutory
and can be changed, the alterations of these statutes should
make the administrative proposal functional and legal.223
V.

THE ANTE-MORTEM EXPERIENCE

Following rapidly on the heels of the renewed interest in
ante-mortem probate exhibited at the end of the past decade,
three states enacted ante-mortem statutes based on the contest
model: North Dakota in 1977,224 Ohio in 1978,225 and Arkansas in 1979.226 Simultaneously, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws drafted several ver220.
221.
222.

Id. at 114.
Id. at 115.
Id.

223. Id. at 117.
224. 1977 N.D. Laws ch. 296, codified at N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 30.1-08.1-01 to -04
(Supp. 1987).
225. 1978 Ohio Laws H. 505, codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2107.081-.085
(Anderson Supp. 1987).
226. 1979 Ark. Acts 194, codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 28-40-201 to -203 (1987).
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sions of a Uniform Ante-Mortem Probate of Wills Act.227 After this auspicious beginning, enthusiasm for ante-mortem
probate began to wane once again. No state has since enacted
ante-mortem legislation and the National Conference -has
abandoned its work on the Uniform Act.228 This section analyzes these acts and discusses the scant evidence which is
available that concerns the use and effectiveness of antemortem probate.
A. North Dakota
1. Analysis of Statute
The North Dakota Ante-Mortem Probate Act is a concise statute providing a simple method for the testator to obtain a declaratory judgment regarding various aspects of his
will. 229 The Act authorizes the court to render a judgment

declaring that particular requirements for a valid will have
been satisfied. The types of matters for which a declaratory
judgment may be obtained vary. They range from compliance
with formalities, such as the testator's signature and the required number of witnesses and their signatures, to elements
of testamentary capacity and freedom from undue
influence.23°
All of the beneficiaries named in the will, as well as those
who would be intestate successors if the testator were to die,
are necessary parties to the action. 23 1 To further solidify the

standing of the testator's potential testate and intestate takers,
the Act declares that these people have inchoate property
rights.2 32 These parties are served with process under the normal North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure.233
If the court determines that the will was properly executed and that the testator has testamentary capacity and was
not unduly influenced, it declares that the will is valid and
227. UNIF. ANTE-MORTEM PROB. OF WILLS ACT (N.C.C.U.S.L., Proposed Drafts
A & B, 1980).
228. Letter from Richard V. Wellman to Gerry W. Beyer (Oct. 7, 1987).
229. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 30.1-08.1-01 to -04 (Supp. 1987). This statute is reproduced in full in Appendix B.
230. Id. § 30.1-08.1-01.
231. Id. § 30.1-08.1-02.
232. Id.
233. Id.
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orders that it be filed.234 This will is then binding on all possible contestants unless and until the testator executes a new
will and institutes a new ante-mortem proceeding which
names both the appropriate parties to the new action as well
as the parties to the former proceeding. 35 Thus, a subsequent
will or written revocation is insufficient to negate the antemortem probate.
The ante-mortem proceeding is for the limited purpose of
determining the will's validity. As a result, facts found in this
proceeding are not admissible into evidence in any other action.2 36 In addition, the determination in the ante-mortem
proceeding is binding on the parties to the action only in litigation brought to determine the validity of a will; in all other
23
cases, the same fact questions may be relitigated.
2.

Experience

Despite being the oldest modem ante-mortem statute, being in effect for almost a dozen years, the North Dakota AnteMortem Probate Act is rarely used.238 When the Act is followed, the proceedings appear to progress smoothly. There is
some evidence that post-mortem contests have been avoided
because the testator chose to use the Act.239 There have been
few, if any, contests of ante-mortem probate2" and no reported cases were located which dealt with ante-mortem probate issues.
B. Ohio
1. Analysis of Statute
The Ohio statutes that provide for an ante-mortem declaration of the validity of a will are the most detailed of the
234. Id. § 30.1-08.1-03.
235. Id.
236. Id. § 30.1-08.1-04.
237. Id.
238.' Letter from John M. Nilles to Gerry W. Beyer (Nov. 7, 1988).
239. Letter from John M. Nilles to Gerry W. Beyer (Jan. 18, 1988) (discussing
situation where ante-mortem probate of a will of testatrix who was marginally competent may have prevented post-mortem contest).
240. Letter from John M. Nilles to Gerry W. Beyer (Nov. 7, 1988) (stating that
what would have been North Dakota's first contested ante-mortem probate was shifted
to a post-death proceeding because of plaintiff's death).
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three states having ante-mortem legislation.2 41 The substance
of the Ohio provisions are basically the same as those of North
Dakota; that is, an adoption of the contest model. However,
the Ohio statute differs in its extensive procedural rules and in
other important aspects. The most significant additions and
changes made by Ohio to the North Dakota statute include:
(1) Detailed venue rules; 242 (2) extensive service of process
rules;24 3 (3) comprehensive rules regarding petitions and hearings to revoke or to modify a will which has been admitted to
ante-mortem probate; 244 (4) non-use of ante-mortem probate
is inadmissible as evidence or as an admission that the testator
lacked testamentary capacity or was unduly influenced; 245
(5) the will and a declaration of its validity are filed in a sealed
envelope to which only the testator has access during his lifetime-if removed, the declaration of validity no longer has
any effect;24 6 and (6) the testator may modify or revoke the
will using any method allowed under Ohio law; a new antemortem proceeding is not required.247
2.

Experience

Compared to those of North Dakota and Arkansas, the
Ohio ante-mortem statutes have generated the greatest use,
perhaps owing to the larger population of Ohio resulting in
the increased interest in ante-mortem probate.248 In Cooper v.
Woodard,24 9 an Ohio court of appeals was confronted with an
attack on the constitutionality of the ante-mortem provisions.
The court determined that the pleadings showed that a justici241. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2107.081-.085 (Anderson Supp. 1987). This statute is reproduced in full in Appendix C.
242. See id. § 2107.081(A) (venue is normally in probate court of county of testator's domicile).
243. Id. § 2107.082.
244. Id. § 2107.084(C).
245. Id. § 2107.081(B).
246. Id. § 2107.084(B).
247. Id. § 2107.084(D).
248. Population of Ohio as determined by the 1980 census was 10,798,000 as compared to 653,000 for North Dakota and 2,286,000 for Arkansas. U.S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1988 (108th ed. 1987).
Several law review articles have focused on the Ohio enactment of ante-mortem probate
while few, if any, have focused on the North Dakota or Arkansas statutes. See, e.g.,
Edwards, supra note 119; Comment, supra note 5; Comment, supra note 17.
249. 1983 WL 6566 (Ohio Ct. App.).
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able controversy existed and that "[e]xcept for legislation affecting the right of free speech, assembly, etc., and those rights
attendant to keeping open the channels for change of government, legislation is presumed to be constitutional."25 0 Because the court found nothing in the record of the case to
rebut the presumption of constitutionality, the Ohio antemortem statutes were held to pass constitutional muster. 251 In
addition, the court affirmed the lower court's refusal to entertain a motion regarding the interpretation of the will by
stressing that the sole purpose of the 252
ante-mortem proceeding
is to determine the validity of a will.
Another Ohio court confronted the problem of whether
the admission of a will to ante-mortem probate was proper
under the particular facts of Fischer v. Greene. 53 The court
held that ante-mortem probate was proper even though the
testatrix had been previously determined to be sufficiently
mentally incompetent so that a guardian was needed. 4 Because the testatrix was shown to have testamentary capacity
by her knowledge that she was executing a will, her knowledge of the objects of her bounty, and her knowledge of the
nature of her property, a determination of the validity of the
will was proper.255
Despite the greater awareness of the ante-mortem probate alternative in Ohio, it nonetheless appears that the statute
is infrequently used.256 In the first eight years of its availability, approximately eight ante-mortem probate cases were filed
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. No. 82-CA-71 (Ohio Ct. App. April 8, 1983).
254. Id.
255. Id. Other Ohio courts have cited the ante-mortem provisions but were not
called upon to resolve ante-mortem issues. See Coleman v. Rawa, 1985 WL 4442 (Ohio
Ct. App.) (declaratory judgment that decedent concealed property); Corron v. Corron,
40 Ohio St. 3d 75, -, 531 N.E.2d 708, 710 (1988) ("whether the probate court has
jurisdiction to render a declaratory judgment regarding the validity of a will not admitted to probate and the legal status of certain inter vivos transfers by the testator of
property unrelated to the administration of the estate").
256. Letter from Marvin R. Pliskin to Gerry W. Beyer'(Nov. 29, 1988) (discussing
belief that ante-mortem probate is "very sparingly used"); Letter from Judge Richard B.
Metcalf to Gerry W. Beyer (Oct. 6, 1987) (indicating that in his experience as Probate
Court Judge of Franklin County, Ohio ante-mortem probate "has very little use").
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in Franklin County, one of Ohio's largest counties.2 5 7 It is

25 8
believed that even fewer cases were filed in other counties.
The statute appears to be used most frequently when an attorney has prepared a will for a person who is under guardianship or who is elderly.259 Few applications are denied because
lawyers usually pre-screen clients to determine if they are reason ably competent before attempting to use ante-mortem
probate. 2 °

C. Arkansas
1. Analysis of Statute
In 1979, Arkansas became the third and most recent state
to enact ante-mortem legislation. 26 ' Although the Arkansas

Ante-Mortem Probate Act is closely modeled after the North
Dakota provisions, several important changes were made.
First, the Arkansas Act is more broadly phrased to permit
declaratory judgments concerning the validity of the will
rather than limiting the action to specific aspects of the will's
validity. 62 Second, and perhaps of greater significance, the
Arkansas Act employs a more liberal approach to modification and revocation. For example, an ante-mortem probated
will "may be modified or superseded by subsequently executed
valid wills, codicils, and other testamentary instruments,
263
whether or not validated" with ante-mortem proceedings.
However, the Arkansas Act does not address whether a revocation by physical act is permitted because the statute only
257.
258.
259.

Letter from Judge Richard B. Metcalf to Gerry W. Beyer (Oct. 6, 1987).
Id.
Id.

260.

Id.

261. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-40-201 to -203 (1987). This statute is reproduced in
full in Appendix D.
262. Compare ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-40-202(a) (1987) (declaratory judgment to
establish validity of will) with N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-08.1-01 (Supp. 1987) (declaratory judgment permitted regarding the "signature on the will, the required number of

witnesses to the signature and their signatures, and the testamentary capacity and freedom from undue influence of the person executing the will"). .Cf OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2107.084 (Anderson Supp. 1987) (declaratory judgment allowed regarding
whether will was executed pursuant to statutory formalities, testator had requisite testa-

mentary capacity, and was free from undue influence).
263. Compare ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-40-203(b) (1987) with N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 30.1-08.1-03 (Supp. 1987) (ante-mortem probated will remains binding unless new

ante-mortem proceeding).
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applies to subsequently executed testamentary instruments.2 4
in
Third, the Arkansas Act does not prohibit findings of fact 265
ante-mortem actions from being used in other proceedings.
2.

Experience

The Arkansas Ante-Mortem Probate Act seems to be virtually ignored.2 6 6 No reported cases were located which dealt
with ante-mortem probate issues. One Arkansas practitioner
speculates that although the ante-mortem statute is important,
most testators do not wish to disclose the contents of their
wills; therefore, they do not elect to use this estate planning
technique.2 67
D.

National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws

Responding to the renewed interest in ante-mortem probate reflected by both state legislatures and legal commentators, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws began the task of investigating the feasibility of
ante-mortem probate in 1979.268 By late 1980, the Uniform
Ante-Mortem Probate of Wills Act drafting committee considered two proposals: (1) a declaratory judgment/contest
model format developed by the Joint Editorial Board-Uniform Probate Code (Draft A) and; (2) an administrative
model based on the writings of Professors Alexander and
Pearson 269 drafted by the Ante-Mortem Probate of Wills Act
Committee (Draft B).2 7°
264. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-40-203(b) (1987). The Ohio statute permits revocation
of an ante-mortem probated will by any statutorily authorized method. OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2107.084(D) (Anderson Supp. 1987).
265. Compare ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-40-203 (1987) (no limitation on use of court
findings) with N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-08.1-04 (Supp. 1987) (findings of fact not admissible in other proceedings).
266. Letter from Jean D. Stockburger to Gerry W. Beyer (Nov. 8, 1988).
267. Id.
268. Letter from Richard V. Wellman to James R. Wade 1-2 (Oct. 12, 1981) (Conference's Scope and Program Committee declined to give its go-ahead recommendation
in August 1978; the matter was resubmitted and approved in 1979).
269. UNIF. ANTE-MORTEM PROB. OF WILLS ACT § 1 comment (N.C.C.U.S.L.,
Proposed Draft B, 1980). See generally supra § IV(C).
270. Memorandum from Gregory S. Alexander to Drafting Committee, UNIFORM
ANTE-MORTEM PROBATE OF WILLS ACT 1 (Oct. 15, 1980).
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Draft A-A Contest Approach

Draft A reflects the contest approach and was derived
from the North Dakota, Ohio, and Arkansas statutes which
were already in effect. 271 The most significant difference between these state statutes and Draft A is that under Draft A's
procedure any judgment which the testator obtained declaring
that his will had been duly executed and is his valid will subject only to revocation, would not be binding on the testator's
spouse and decedents. 272 Thus, the utility of ante-mortem
probate under Draft A was severely limited because the testator's spouse and children are the most likely individuals to
contest a will especially if they are given less than the amount
they would receive under intestacy.
To begin the ante-mortem process under Draft A, the testator would file a petition containing a copy of the will along
with allegations that the will is a properly signed and witnessed will which was executed with testamentary intent and
that the testator had testamentary capacity, free will, and familiarity with its contents.273
The defendants to the declaratory judgment action would
be "a representative group named from among the heirs presumptive of the [testator] and others who, as devisees under
earlier wills of the [testator] or for other reasons, appear to
have some prospect of being selected as devisees of the [testator]. 274 If the presumptive heirs are the testator's spouse or
descendents, then the defendants would be chosen from those
who would be the testator's presumptive heirs if the testator
had no spouse or descendants.2 7 5 All of the potential defendants would be named as defendants if their number were
small. If the number of potential defendants were large, then
several would be sued on behalf of them all.276 If all potential
defendants are not joined, the court must find that those
joined would adequately protect all parties with similar
271.
272.

Id.
UNIF. ANTE-MORTEM PROB. OF WILLS'ACT § 1(a) (N.C.C.U.S.L., Draft A,

Nov. 1980). The complete text of this draft act is reproduced in Appendix E.
273. Id. § l(b).
274. Id. § 1(c).
275. Id.
276. Id.
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interests.277
The defendants would receive normal service of process.27 The court Would be authorized to have additional parties served to assure that those with interests adverse to the
testator are adequately represented. 7 9 Interested parties
would be allowed to intervene and the will beneficiaries would
be made parties if the ante-mortem petition were opposed. 280
After proper notice, the court would conduct a hearing
examining the testator, the attesting witnesses, and other witnesses or relevant evidence. 21 1 The court would be authorized
to make any independent inquiry it deems appropriate 282 including calling "independent witnesses, physicians, psychologists, psychiatrists, and other persons of its own choosing to
examine the testator or to testify in the proceedings. ' 283 If the
court sustained the testator's allegations, the will would be declared valid and subject only to subsequent revocation.284 The
original will would remain with the court.285
Once the will is accepted by the court, the judgment is
binding on the defendants and the persons whose interests
they represented. However, the court's judgment would not
bind the testator's spouse or descendants who would be free to
contest the will after the testator's death.286 If, on the other
hand, the court found for the defendants, the judgment would
be a conclusive determination of the will's invalidity.287
If the successful testator later decided to revoke this will,
he would be permitted to withdraw the will provided that he
signed a statement of revocation on the face of the will at the
277. Id.
278. See id. § l(d) (referring to appropriate provision of UNIFORM PROBATE
CODE).

279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id. § 2(a). "Any' person who is a competent witness may testify concerning
any issue despite possible disqualification after the death of the testator and shall not be
precluded by reason of interest." Id. § 2(b).
282. Id.
283. See id. § 2(c) (erroneously listed as sub-section (3) in original).
284. Id. § 3(a).
285. Id.
286. Id. § 3(b).
287. Id.
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time of its withdrawal from the court.2"' In addition, the testator could revoke or modify the will by a subsequent written
will or codicil even though the court is not required to be notified of the testator's actions.2"9
2.

Draft B-An Administrative Approach

A fundamentally different approach is taken by Draft B
which adopts an exparte administrative approach. 290 Draft B

appears to be designed either as a comprehensive free-standing
act which could be adopted by any state or as a complement
to the Uniform Probate Code.2 91
Draft B provides that a testator may "apply to a court in
the county of his domicile for a determination that his will has
been duly executed and is his valid will subject only to subsequent revocation.

' 292

Under this draft, ante-mortem probate

would have no affect on the ambulatory nature of the will,
because the testator would be free to revoke the will in any
manner permitted under state law.293
Draft B details the contents of the application and provides that the original will must be filed along with the application.294 However, to protect the testator's privacy the will
does not have to be available for public inspection.295
Once the application is filed, the court would appoint a
special master to assist the court in making determinations regarding due execution of the will. 296 The master would be re-

quired to interview the testator as well as members of the
288.
289.
290.

Id. § 4.
Id.
Memorandum from Gregory S. Alexander to Drafting Committee, UNIFORM
ANTE-MORTEM PROBATE OF WILLS ACT 1 (Oct. 15, 1980).
291. UNIF. ANTE-MORTEM PROB. OF WILLS ACT (N.C.C.U.S.L., Proposed Draft
B, 1980). The complete text of this draft act excluding comments is reproduced in
Appendix F.
292. Id. § l(a).
293. Id. at comment.
294. Id. § l(b) (the application must allege various formalities, testamentary intent,
execution by free will, and familiarity with will's contents).
295. See id.(only the court or those whom the court determines to be necessary and
proper may view the original or any copy of the testator's will).
296. Id. § 2(a). The master must be a qualified attorney with no interest in the
verification of the will. Id. The master's purpose is to assist the court; he "is not a
fiduciary representing the interests of undisclosed, would-be contestants." Id. at

comment.
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testator's family, other relatives, friends, and anyone whom
the court deemed appropriate.297 In addition, the court has
the discretion to delegate to the master various investigative
powers such as the right to the production of relevant documents.2 98 The drafters anticipated that a court would examine
the gifts made in the will and determine the scope of the
master's duties, powers, and responsibilities so that all relevant facts would be ascertained. 29 9 After the master com-

pleted his investigation, he would submit a detailed written
report for the court's in camera inspection. 3°
If the court deemed it appropriate, a hearing would then
be conducted. 01 The court could interview the testator and
other relevant witnesses as well as view physical evidence.30 2
In addition, the court would be authorized to call as witnesses
"physicians, psychologists, psychiatrists, and other persons of
its own choosing to examine the testator or to be interviewed
by the Court.

' 30 3

The testator would be represented by his

attorney or if he had none, by court-appointed counsel. 3°
This hearing would be closed. 30 5

Because the procedure

would be ex parte in nature, prior notice would not be given to
anyone except the testator and witnesses. Other individuals,
such as family members, prospective heirs, and beneficiaries,
would not be granted the opportunity to appear.30 6 Thus,
confidentiality would be assured and the hearing would not
become adversarial in nature.30 7
If the court believes that all the formalities for a valid will
are satisfied-that the testator has testamentary intent, that he
297. Id. § 2(b). When the master interviews the testator, it must be outside of the
presence of the attorney who drafted the will. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id. at comment. Thus, if the testator disinherited his spouse and/or children
in favor of distant relatives, friends, or charity, a more thorough investigation could be
conducted. Id.

300. Id.
301.
hearing
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.

Id. § 3. Although this hearing is not required, the drafters believed that a
would be routinely held. Id. at comment.
Id. § 3(a).
Id. § 3(b).
Id. § 3(a).
Id. § 3(b).
Id. at comment.
Id. -
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executed the will with his free will, and that he is familiar with
its contents-the court will issue a written determination."'
This determination would state that the will was duly executed and is valid, subject only to the testator's subsequent
withdrawal or revocation. 30 9 The court
would then retain cus310
tody of the original copy of the will.

A determination of the validity of the will would be "conclusive and binding on all persons.

' 31 1

The only way to con-

test a will admitted to ante-mortem probate under this
procedure would be to allege that the will had been subsequently revoked. 12 In addition, no further action would
be
31 3
needed upon the testator's death to probate the will.

The testator would be permitted to withdraw a will from
the court that had already determined it to be valid by filing a
written notice of withdrawal or revocation.3" 4 Once the testator files this notice, the will would be of no effect. 3 15 Addition-

ally, the testator could revoke or modify the will with a
subsequent will or codicil even if no notice is given to the
court 3 16
Draft B provides that the special master and all other
persons employed by either the court or the special master are
entitled to reasonable compensation
and that the testator is
3 17
responsible for these expenses.
3.

Abandonment of Ante-Mortem Project

The Drafting Committee for the Uniform Ante-Mortem
Probate of Wills Act met on the seventh and eighth of November, 1980 to discuss these two drafts.3 "' The Committee
did not adopt either draft, rather, they decided to develop a
new draft which would incorporate various policy decisions
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
whether
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.

Id. § 4.
Id.
Id.
Id. § 5.
Id.
See'id. (however, post-mortem proceedings would be necessary to determine
the will was subsequently revoked or modified).
Id. § 6.
Id.
Id.
Id. § 7.
Memorandum to JEB-UPC from R.V. Wellman 8 (Nov. 17, 1980).
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made at the meeting.3" 9 For example, the new statute would
not contain a description of a special master; instead, each
court would use its inherent power to determine whether extraordinary investigations were needed.3 20 Additionally, the
court would retain a copy of the validated will but would return the original will to the testator. The ante-mortem probate file would be sealed and only be opened upon petition of
the testator or someone exhibiting the testator's death certificate.321 Perhaps the area of greatest debate was the binding
effect of the decree. The new draft was to contain three options: (1) binding on everyone except to show ,fraud on the
court or revocation; (2) binding except against testator's
spouse and children; or (3) binding unless rebutted by evidence showing that the court
was unaware of relevant facts
3 22
when it validated the will.

Shortly thereafter, the Joint Editorial Board-Uniform
Probate Code voted on whether to continue the ante-mortem
project. The vote was evenly split.323 Upon learning of the

Board's lack of support, the Drafting Committee voted to cancel the project

324

thus eliminating the hopes of a quick re-

sponse to the need for uniform ante-mortem legislation.
VI.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF
ANTE-MORTEM PROBATE

The intense interest in ante-mortem probate generated by
the burst of commentaries in the late 1970s and reflected in
the actions of the legislatures of several states and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
should not be allowed to wither despite the current lack of
wide-spread acceptance of the technique. Ante-mortem probate has the potential of greatly improving the ability of our
legal system to effectively transmit an individual's wealth by
providing the testator with greater certainty that his distribution desires will be fulfilled. Because the validity of the will
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.

Id. at 9.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 10.
Letter from Richard V. Wellman to James R. Wade (Oct. 12, 1981).
Id.
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would be determined prior to death when all relevant evidence
is before the court, will contests would be greatly reduced. In
addition, ante-mortem probate would lead to more efficient
use of scarce and valuable resources because less court time
would be spent dealing with spurious will contests and fewer
estate funds would be dissipated defending those contests.
Like any legal tool, ante-mortem probate is not without
its difficulties. However, problems encountered with the technique are surmountable or are able to be counterbalanced.
Several different models of ante-mortem probate exist which
range from a pure adversarial format, the contest model; to an
ex parte format, the administrative model. Each model has its
positive and negative aspects. There is much debate over
which model is preferable. This debate has caused some commentators to conclude that ante-mortem probate is not feasible 325 and has resulted in the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws abandoning its antemortem project.326
The authors hope that this article will spur a rekindling
of interest in ante-mortem probate. No attempt is being made
to recommend the particular details of the best ante-mortem
scheme because the decision to proceed with ante-mortem
probate legislation must first be made. Once a commitment is
made to develop a workable ante-mortem scheme, attention
can be focused on the details of the technique. The benefits of
ante-mortem probate should not be withheld from the public
merely because the technique is flawed or because it is difficult
to ascertain which model will function best.
At this time, there is insufficient experience with the various options to conclude which one is best. What is needed is
serious consideration of ante-mortem probate. State legislatures should examine the area carefully and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws should
reactivate their ante-mortem drafting committee. Bar associations and attorneys in states which have already enacted antemortem legislation should publicize the technique and its advantages so that more testators avail themselves of the proce325.

See Fellows, supra note 18, at 1114 (the purpose of the article is to "discourage

the adoption of living probate schemes").
326. See supra notes 318-324.
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dure. As more testators use the technique and as more
statutes are enacted, evidence, rather than speculation, will be
available to evaluate the ante-mortem probate models and
lead to an informed decision as to the most effective model. It
may even be possible that several models could co-exist in the
same state giving the testator the option as to method and
effect.
The testator's desire to insure that the distribution of his
estate is not frustrated by a will contest differs with each individual. Some testators may have no interest in any type of
ante-mortem procedure because his will treats potential heirs
in a manner similar to the state's intestate distribution statutes. Others might be satisfied with a simple procedural
change that eases the proponent's burden of proof of a valid
will. A third group of testators, realizing that their will stands
a high probability of being contested, may wish, and be willing
to pay for, an absolutely fool-proof means. of precluding a contest. The third situation provides the most obvious scenario
for using ante-mortem probate.
The present general status of probate law requires an applicant who seeks to probate a will to prove all statutory requirements that concern the competency and capacity of the
328
testator 327 as well as the requisite formalities of the will.
For most testators, this may not be an undesirable require327. See, e.g., Estate of Sanderson v. Martin, 341 P.2d 358, 363 (Cal. Ct. App.
1959) (presumption exists that a person is sane at the execution of a will with the burden on the contestant to show incapacity); In re Young, 60 Ohio App. 2d 390, -, 397
N.E.2d 1223, 1225-26 (1978) (will must be admitted when the proponents introduce
substantial evidence tending to prove the validity of the will); Nowlin v. Trottman, 348
S.W.2d 169, 172 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) (the proponent has burden of proof in making
out a prima facia case of testamentary capacity); see also CAL. PROB. CODE § 8252
(Deering Supp. 1989) (proponents have burden of proof of due execution when will
contested); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.18 (Baldwin 1988) (a court shall admit to
probate a will if it appears from the face of the will or demanded by attesting witnesses
that its execution complies with the law valid at that time).
328. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6110 (Deering Supp. 1989) (a valid executed will requires a writing signed by testator or by his direction in the presence of two attesting
witnesses who understand that instrument they sign is testator's will); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2107.03 (Baldwin 1988) (a valid executed will requires a writing signed at the
end of the document by a party making it or by his designated person in testator's
presence and be attested and subscribed in his presence by two or more competent witnesses who saw testator subscribe or heard him acknowledge his signature); TEX. PROB.
CODE ANN. § 59 (Vernon 1980) (every last will shall be in writing signed by testator or
person designated by him in his presence attested to, if not wholly in testator's hand-
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ment. However, cases illustrate that in many instances this
burden can be a pit-fall.129 A change in this burden of proof
may result in a procedure which is more fair in many instances. For example, if the will is self-proved by statutory
affidavit as is allowed in many states,33 ° or if the will execution
ceremony is videotaped, 3 then a statutory presumption that
the will is valid and proper for probate could be created. A
contest would continue to be permitted, but the burden of
proof would shift to the contestant to prove the invalidity of
the will.
Finally, if the testator desires and is willing to absorb the
cost of the procedure, an ante-mortem technique should be
available to assure the effectiveness of a testator's resolution
that a will contest will not occur. Although it may be premature to make a knowledgeable recommendation as to whether
an adversarial, guardianship, or administrative model of antemortem probate should be adopted, law makers should undauntingly pursue this viable alternative to post-mortem
probate.
writing, by two or more credible witnesses over fourteen years of age who shall subscribe their names thereto in their own handwriting in the presence of testator).
329. See, e.g., Estate of Morgan v. Peterson, 225 Cal. App. 2d 156, -, 37 Cal. Rptr.
160, 168-69 (1964) (testamentary incompetency on a given day can be proven by incompetency at times prior to and after that date particularly when characteristics of testator's malady indicate permanent and progressing mental disease); Estate of Bliss v.
Williams, 199 Cal. App. 2d 630, -, 18 Cal. Rptr. 821, 827 (1962) (finding that testator
was of unsound mind when the will was executed was sustained by evidence that the
testator was not aware of his properties and mentally incapable of transacting any business); Borgman v. Dillow, 61 Ohio L. Abs. 429, -, 105 N.E.2d 69, 70 (Ohio Ct. App.
1951) (will not admitted to probate where proponent failed to prove that witness saw
testatrix's signature and where testatrix failed to tell witness that she had signed it); In
re Stock's Will, 174 Okla. 78, -, 49 P.2d 503, 505 (1935) (proponents failed to prove
due execution and attestation of a will by a preponderance of evidence); Hogan v. Stoepler, 82 S.W.2d 1000, 1002 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) (will failed where alleged testator did
not execute the will according to statutory prerequisites and alleged subscribing witnesses did not witness it).
330. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 474.337 (Vernon Supp. 1989) (self-proving will
provision); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 55 (West Supp. 1989) (self-proving will clause);
20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3132.1 (Purdon Supp. 1988) (provision for self-proving
will); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 59 (Vernon 1980) (self-proving will provision).
331. See supra § nI(B)(4) and accompanying notes.
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APPENDIX A
Michigan Act
1883 Mich. Pub. St. 17
Sect. 1. The people of the state of Michigan enact, that
to any will heretofore or hereafter executed, the testator may
make and annex- his petition to be sworn to before and
presented to the judge of probate for the county where the
testator resides, asking that such will be admitted and established as his last will and testament.
Sect. 2. Every such petition shall contain averments
that such will was duly executed by the petitioner without
fear, fraud, impartiality, or undue influence, and with a full
knowledge of its contents, and that the testator is of sound
mind and memory and full testamentary capacity and shall
state the names and addresses of every person who at the time
of making and filing the same would be interested in the estate
of the maker of such will as heir if such maker should at the
making of such petition become deceased, and may also contain the names and addresses of any other persons whom such
testator may desire to make parties to such proceedings.
Sect. 3. Such judge of probate shall thereupon, upon request of such testator, appoint a time for the hearing of such
petition and issue citations to the parties named in such petition, and direct published notice of such hearing, and have
such hearing, after proof of service of citations and of publication of notice, in the manner, as near as practicable, as is required for the probate of wills.
Sect. 4. If any person named in such petition shall be a
minor, or otherwise under disability, a guardian ad litem shall
be appointed by such judge to represent such person. On such
hearing such judge of probate shall examine into the matters
alleged in such petition, and into the testamentary capacity of
such testator, and examine witnesses in relation thereto, and if
it shall appear that the allegations of such petition are true,
and that said testator was of sound mind and memory and full
testamentary capacity, such judge shall make a decree
thereon, and shall cause a copy of such decree to be attached
to said will, certified under the seal of said court, decreeing
that the testator, at the making of such will and such petition,
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was possessed of sound mind and memory, and full testamentary capacity, and that said will Was executed without fear,
fraud, impartiality or undue influence, which decree shall
have the same effect as if made by said court after the death of
the testator on the probate of such will, and such will having
been so established shall not be set aside or impeached on the
grounds of insanity or want of testamentary capacity on the
part of the testator, or that the same was executed through
fear, fraud, impartiality, or undue influence.
Sect. 5. Appeals shall be in the same manner as from
probate of wills.
Sect. 6. Nothing in this act contained shall be construed
to prevent the revocation of such will, or alteration or other
change thereof, as in ordinary wills.
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APPENDIX B
North Dakota
N.D. Cent. Code (Supp. 1987)
Chapter 30.1-08.1
Ante-Mortem Probate of Wills

30.1-08.1-01. Declaratory judgment. Any person who
executes a will disposing of his estate in accordance with this
title may institute a proceeding under chapter 32-23 for a
judgment declaring the validity of the will as to the signature
on the will, the required number of witnesses to the signature
and their signatures, and the testamentary capacity and freedom from undue influence of the person executing the will.
30.1-08.1-02. Parties-Process. Any beneficiary named
in the will and all the testator's present intestate successors
shall be named parties to the proceeding. For the purposes of
this chapter, any beneficiary named in the will and all the testator's present intestate successors shall be deemed possessed
of inchoate property rights.
Service of process upon the parties to the proceeding
shall be made in accordance with rule 4 of the North Dakota
Rules of Civil Procedure.
30.1-08.1-03. Finding of validity-Revocation. If the
court finds under chapter 32-23 that the will has been properly executed and that the plaintiff testator has the requisite
testamentary capacity and freedom from undue influence, it
shall declare the will valid and order it placed on file with the
court. For the purposes of section 30.1-12-02, a finding of validity under this chapter shall constitute an adjudication of
probate. The will shall be binding in North Dakota unless
and until the plaintiff-testator executes a new will and institutes a new proceeding under this chapter naming the appropriate parties to the new proceeding as well as the parties to
any former proceeding brought under this chapter.
30.1-08.1-04. Admissibility of facts-Effect on other actions. The facts found in a proceeding brought under this
chapter shall not be admissible in evidence in any proceeding
other than one brought in North Dakota to determine the validity of a will; nor shall the determination in a proceeding
under this chapter be binding, upon the parties to such pro-
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ceeding, in any action not brought to determine the validity of
a will.
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APPENDIX C
Ohio
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. (Anderson Supp. 1987)
Declaration of Validity of Will

[§ 2107.08.1] § 2107.081 Petition for judgment declaring validity of will.
(A) A person who executes a will allegedly in conformity with the laws of this state may petition the probate court of
the county in which he is domiciled, if he is domiciled in this
state or the probate court of the county in which any of his
real property is located, if he is not domiciled in this state, for
a judgment declaring the validity of the will.
The petition may be filed in the form determined by the
probate court of the county in which it is filed.
The petition shall name as parties defendant all persons
named in the will as beneficiaries, and all of the persons who
would be entitled to inherit from the testator under Chapter
2105. of the Revised Code had the testator died intestate on
the date the petition was filed.
For the purposes of this section, "domicile" shall be determined at the time of filing the petition with the probate
court.
(B) The failure of a testator to file a petition for a judgment declaring the validity of a will he has executed shall not
be construed as evidence or an admission that the will was not
properly executed pursuant to section 2107.03 of the Revised
Code or any prior law of this state in effect at the time of
execution or as evidence or an admission that the testator did
not have the requisite testamentary capacity and freedom
from undue influence under section 2107.02 of the Revised
Code.
[§ 2107.082] § 2107.082 Service of process.
Service of process in an action authorized by section
2107.081 [2107.08.1] of the Revised Code shall be made on
every party defendant named in that action by the following
methods:
(A) By certified mail, or any other valid personal service permitted by the Rules of Civil Procedure, if the party is
an inhabitant of this state or is found within this state;
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(B) By certified mail, with a copy of the summons and
petition, to the party at his last known address or any other
valid personal service permitted by the Rules of Civil Procedure, if the party is not an inhabitant of this state or is not
found within this state;
(C) By publication, according to Civil Rule 4.4, in a
newspaper of general circulation published in the county
where the petition was filed, for three consecutive weeks, if the
address of the party is unknown, if all methods of personal
service permitted under division (B) of this section were attempted without success, or if the interest of the party under
the will or in the estate of the testator should the will be declared invalid is unascertainable at that time.
[§ 2107.08.3] § 2107.083 Hearing on validity of will.
When a petition is filed pursuant to section 2107.081
[2107.08.1] of the Revised Code, the probate court shall conduct a hearing on the validity of the will. The hearing shall be
adversary in nature and shall be conducted pursuant to section 2721.10 of the Revised Code, except as otherwise provided in sections 2107.081 [2107.08.1] to 2107.085 [2107.08.5]
of the Revised Code.
[§ 2107.08.4] § 2107.084 Declaration of validity; sealing, filing; procedure for revoking or modifying will.
(A) The probate court shall declare the will valid if, after conducting a proper hearing pursuant to section 2107.083
[2107.08.3] of the Revised Code, it finds that the will was
properly executed pursuant to section 2107.03 of the Revised
Code or under any prior law of this state that was in effect at
the time of execution and that the testator had the requisite
testamentary capacity and freedom from undue influence pursuant to section 2107.03 of the Revised Code.
Any such judgment declaring a will valid is binding in
this state as to the validity of the will on all facts found, unless
provided otherwise in this section, section 2107.33, or division
(B) of section 2107.71 of the Revised Code, and, if the will
remains valid, shall give the will full legal effect as the instrument of disposition of the testator's estate, unless the will has
been modified or revoked according to law.
(B) Any declaration of validity issued as a judgment
pursuant to this section shall be sealed in an envelope along
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with the will to which it pertains, and filed by the probate
judge or his designated officer in the offices of that probate
court. The filed will shall be available during the testator's
lifetime only to the testator. If the testator removes a filed will
from the possession of the probate judge, the declaration of
validity rendered under division (A) of this section no longer
has any effect.
(C) A testator may revoke or modify a will declared
valid and filed with a probate court pursuant to this section by
petitioning the probate court in possession of the will and asking that the will be revoked or modified. The petition shall
include a document executed pursuant to sections 2107.02 and
2107.03 of the Revised Code, and shall name as parties defendant those persons who were parties defendant in any previous action declaring the will valid, those persons who are
named in any modification as beneficiaries, and those persons
who would be entitled because of the revocation or modification, to inherit from the testator under Chapter 2105. of the
Revised Code had the testator died intestate on the date the
petition was filed. Service of the petition and process shall be
made on these parties by the methods authorized in section
2107.082 [2107.08.2] of the Revised Code.
Unless waived by all parties, the court shall conduct a
hearing on the validity of the revocation or modification requested under this division in the same manner as it would on
any initial petition for a judgment declaring a will to be valid
under this section. If the court finds that the revocation or
modification is valid, as defined in division (A) of this section,
the revocation or modification shall take full effect and be
binding, and revoke the will or modify it to the extent of the
valid modification. The revocation or modification, the judgment declaring it valid, and the will itself shall be sealed in an
envelope and filed with the probate court, and shall be available during the testator's lifetime only to the testator.
(D) A testator may also modify a will by any later will
or codicil executed according to the laws of this state or any
other state and may revoke a will by any method permitted
under section 2107.33 of the Revised Code.
(E) A declaration of validity of a will, or of a revocation
or modification of a will previously determined to be valid,
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given under division (C) of this section, is not subject to collateral attack, except by a person and in the manner specified in
division (B) of section 2107.71 of the Revised Code, but is appealable subject to the terms of Chapter 2721. of the Revised
Code.
[§ 2107.08.5] § 2107.085 Effect on other proceedings.
The finding of facts by a probate court in a proceeding
brought under sections 2107.081 [2107.08.1] to 2107.085
[2107.08.5] of the Revised Code is not admissible as evidence
in any proceeding other than one brought to determine the
validity of a will.
The determination or judgment rendered in a proceeding
under these sections is not binding upon the parties to such a
proceeding in any action not brought to determine the validity
of a will.
The failure of a testator to file a petition for a judgment
declaring the validity of a will he has executed is not admissible as evidence in any proceeding to determine the validity of
that will or any other will executed by the testator.
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APPENDIX D
Arkansas
Ark. Code Ann. (1987)
Ante-Mortem Probate Act
28-40-201. Title.
This subchapter shall be known and may be cited as the
"Arkansas Ante-Mortem Probate Act of 1979."
28-40-202. Action for declaratory judgment.
(a) Any person who executes a will disposing of all or
part of an estate located in Arkansas may institute an action
in the probate court of the appropriate county of this state for
a declaratory judgment establishing the validity of the will.
(b) All beneficiaries named in the will and all the testator's existing intestate successors shall be named parties to the
action.
(c) For the purpose of this subchapter, the beneficiaries
and intestate successors shall be deemed possessed of inchoate
property rights.
(d) Service of process shall be as in other declaratory
judgment actions.
28-40-203. Court findings-Effect.
(a) If the court finds that the will was properly executed, that the testator had the requisite testamentary capacity and freedom from undue influence at the time of execution,
and that the will is otherwise valid, it shall declare the will
valid and order it placed on file with the court.
(b) A finding of validity pursuant to this subchapter
shall constitute an adjudication of probate. However, such
validated wills may be modified or superseded by subsequently
executed valid wills, codicils, and other testamentary instruments, whether or not validated pursuant to this subchapter.
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APPENDIX E
Uniform Ante-Mortem Probate of Wills Act
Draft A
November 7-9, 1980
SECTION 1. (Verification of Will; Declaration of Due
Execution of a Will in Testator's Lifetime.)
(a) Venue. A testator may during his lifetime petition
a court in the county of his domicile for an order binding all
interestedpersons other than his spouse and descendants [declaring] that his will has been duly executed and is his valid
will subject only to subsequent revocation.
(b) Petition. The petition shall contain (1) a copy of
the will which the plaintiff wishes to verify, (2) an allegation
that the will is in writing and was signed by the petitioner or
in the petitioner's name by some other person in the petitioner's presence and by his direction and was signed by two
witnesses in the presence of the testator, (3) an allegation that
the instrument was properly executed with testamentary intent, (4) an allegation that the petitioner had testamentary capacity, (5) an allegation that the petitioner executed the
instrument in the exercise of his own free will, and (6) an allegation that the petitioner is familiar with the contents of the
instrument. The original will shall be filed with the petition.
(c) Defendants. The defendants to the proceedings
shall be a representative group named from among the heirs
presumptive of the plaintiff and others who, as devisees under
earlier wills of the petitioner or for other reasons, appear to
have some prospect of being selected as devisees [testamentary
beneficiaries] of the petitioner. If the heirspresumptive are the
petitioner'sspouse, or descendants, or both, the defendants shall
be named from among those who would be the heirs presumptive if the petitioner were unmarriedand without living descendant. If [these] the potential defendants are not numerous, all
whose interests are adverse shall be named as defendants. If
they are so numerous that joinder of all is impracticable, several may be sued as representative parties on behalf of all.
Before the court allows the action to proceed, if all of the heirs
presumptive and devisees under earlier wills are not joined, it
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shall find that the defendants will adequately protect the interest of all others adverse to the plaintiff.
(d) Service. The defendants shall be served as provided in 1- -. The court may order additional persons made
defendants and served to assure the adequate representation of
the interest of those adverse to the plaintiff. Interested persons, including persons named as beneficiaries of the will in
suit, shall be freely allowed to intervene, and beneficiaries of
the will in suit shall be made parties if the petition is opposed.
SECTION 2. (Hearing; Witnesses.)
(a) Hearing; Inquiry by Court. After notice, the court
shall hear the testator, the attesting witnesses if available and
other witnesses or relevant evidence as the testator or parties
defendant may present. The court may make any independent
inquiry it deems appropriate.
(b) Witnesses; Competence. Any person who is a
competent witness may testify concerning any issue despite
possible disqualification after the death of the testator and
shall not be precluded by reason of interest.
(3)[sic] Court Witnesses. The court may call as independent witnesses, physicians, psychologists, psychiatrists,
and other persons of its own choosing to examine the testator
or to testify in the proceedings.
SECTION 3. (Order; Judgment.)
(a) If the court is satisfied that the allegations of the petition have been sustained, it shall by order declare that the
testator's will has been duly executed and is his valid will subject only to subsequent revocation and shall order the will retained in custody of the court.
(b) The judgment, if for the plaintiff, shall bind the defendants and all persons whose interests they represent but it
shall not be binding on the petitioner'sspouse and descendants
who survive him and are otherwise not disqualified by early
death, renunciation or contract to succeed to his estate. The
judgment, if for the defendants, shall be a conclusive determination that the will which was the subject of the adjudication
was not a valid will.
SECTION 4. (Withdrawal of Will, Revocation.)
A will declared to be valid under this procedure may be
withdrawn during the testator's lifetime provided the testator
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signs a statement of revocation to be written across the face of
the will at the time of withdrawal. A requestfor withdrawalof
a will previously adjudicated to be valid shall be made by verified applicationfiled with the court. [Upon his verified application filed with the court and when so withdrawn shall be
deemed revoked.] A will declared to be valid hereunder may
also be revoked or modified by a subsequent [written] will or
codicil though the court is not informed thereof.
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APPENDIX F
Uniform Ante-Mortem Probate of Wills Act
Draft B
November 7-9, 1980
SECTION 1. (Application for Ante-Mortem Verification of Will; Declarations Regarding Due Execution of Will
During Testator's Lifetime.)
(a) Venue. During his lifetime a testator may apply to a
court in the county of his domicile for a determination that his
will has been duly executed and is his valid will subject only to
subsequent revocation.
(b) Contents of Application. The application shall contain a copy of the will that the applicant wishes to have verified and shall include the following allegations: (1) that the
will is in writing and was signed by the applicant or in the
applicant's name by some other person in the applicant's presence and by his direction and was signed in the presence of the
testator by two persons each of whom witnessed either the
signing or the testator's acknowledgement of the signature or
of the will; (2) that the instrument was properly executed with
testamentary intent; (3) that the applicant executed the instrument in the exercise of his own free will; and (5) [sic] that the
applicant is familiar with the contents of the instrument.
The original will shall be filed with the application, but
neither the original nor any copy thereof shall be available for
inspection by any person other than the Court except as the
Court in its discretion shall determine to be necessary and
proper.
SECTION 2. (Procedure; Appointment of Special
Master.)
(a) Qualifications. Upon the filing of an application, the
Court shall appoint a special master to assist the Court in
making determinations regarding due execution of the will.
The master shall be a qualified attorney having no interest in
verification of the will.
(b) Powers and Duties. The master shall interview the
testator outside the presence of the attorney who prepared the
will. He shall also interview members of the testator's family,
other relatives and friends of the testator, or any other indi-
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vidual as the Court shall direct him. The Court may delegate
to the master such powers of investigation, including the right
to have any relevant documents produced, as it shall deem
appropriate under the circumstances. Following completion
of his investigation, the master shall submit to the Court a
written report detailing his findings. This report shall not be
available for inspection to anyone other than the Court.
SECTION 3. (Procedure; Hearing.)
(a) Hearing; Inquiry by Court. The Court may, if it
deems appropriate, schedule a hearing at which to interview
the testator, the attesting witnesses if available, and any other
witnesses or relevant evidence. The testator shall at all times
be represented by counsel of his own choice or by court-appointed counsel.
(b) Witnesses; Medical Examination. The Court may
call as witnesses physicians, psychologists, psychiatrists, and
other persons of its own choosing to examine the testator or to
be interviewed by the Court. All interviews shall be conducted at a closed hearing.
SECTION 4. (Determination on Application.)
If the Court is satisfied that the allegations of the application have been sustained, it shall issue a written determination
that the testator's will has been duly executed and is his valid
will subject only to subsequent withdrawal of the will or revocation and shall require the will retained in the custody of the
Court.
SECTION 5. (Effect of Determination; Necessity of
Post-Mortem Proceedings to Probate.)
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act,
the determination of validity of a will during the testator's lifetime under this procedure shall be conclusive and binding on
all persons. Any will which has been the subject of a determination of validity under this procedure shall not be subject to
subsequent contest by any person except on the ground of subsequent revocation.
(b) Unless subsequently withdrawn or revoked by the
testator, any will which has been the subject of a determination of validity under this procedure shall be deemed to have
been probated and no proceedings to probate such a will shall
be necessary after the death of the testator, except for pur-
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poses of determining whether such a will has been subsequently revoked or modified.
SECTION 6. (Withdrawal of Will; Revocation.)
A will determined to be valid under the procedure may
be withdrawn during the testator's lifetime provided the testator files with the Court written notice of his withdrawal or
revocation. Upon filing such notice with the Court, the will
previously determined to be valid shall no longer be deemed
his valid will. A will previously determined to be valid hereunder may also be revoked or modified by a subsequent will or
codicil though the Court is not informed thereof.
SECTION 7. (Compensation and Expenses.)
The special master and any physician, psychologist, psychiatrist, or other person employed by the Court or the special
master hereunder are entitled to reasonable compensation.
The testator shall be responsible for expenses associated with
these proceedings.

